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The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and
Adults: The Supreme Court’s Juvenile Punishment
Cases—Constitutional Implications for Regulating
Teenage Sexual Activity
Martin R. Gardner*

I.

Introduction

It is well established that the United States Supreme Court has
never developed a systematic theory of young people’s rights.1 Indeed,
a leading commentator recently questioned whether the Court “is capable of developing a coherent, consistent policy with respect to children’s rights.”2
Such a task is complicated by the fact that three sets of interests—
the child’s, her parents’, and the state’s—routinely coalesce and require
accommodation. Moreover, explicating the theoretical grounds for the
rights of juveniles is further made difficult because the Court has seemingly given support to two conflicting theories of rights in its case law.3
In the more predominant of the two, the Court has often taken the

* Steinhart Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, College of Law. The author expresses his
gratitude to Megan Bischoff for her excellent research assistance. This article is an expansion of
a paper presented at the Symposium on Contemporary Issues Regarding Marriage and Children,
held at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, on March 15, 2013.
1. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process
Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153, 154 (1978); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 258 (1979). In some contexts at least, the
Court has itself eschewed “absolute rules” defining juvenile and parental rights respectively in
favor of case-by-case flexibility. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420 (1981) (declining
to fashion an absolute rule regarding parental notice of pregnant minors’ decision to have an
abortion).
2. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 6 (2011).
3. See infra text and notes at 77–151.
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position that young people are entitled to paternalistic care and protection and not to the array of autonomy rights available to adults.4 At
the same time, some cases appear to grant adult rights of constitutional
personhood5 in some contexts.6
These two inconsistent concepts of rights7 are founded on competing underlying empirical assumptions about the nature of childhood. The protectionist tradition assumes that children, even adolescents, are uniquely vulnerable, dependent, and less competent decision
makers than adults.8 Personhood theorists, on the other hand, rely on
social science data9 supporting the view that adults and adolescents are
equally competent in making important decisions.10

4. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy,
81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 511–17 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, Constitutional Status].
5. My reference to “personhood rights” is described by some as “autonomy rights,” see
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 426, and by others as “choice rights.” See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s
Liberation and the New Equalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,”
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 644 [hereinafter Hafen, Children’s Liberation].
6. See text and notes at 107–151.
7. The Court’s embrace of these inconsistent rights is vividly evidenced by consideration
of two cases delivered the same day. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979), a case denying
procedural protections to minors admitted to state mental hospitals at the behest of their parents
or guardians, the Court expressed a clearly protectionist view: “Most children even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions . . . . Parents can
and must make those judgments.” Yet, in the other case, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707(1979),
the Court appeared to give its blessing to personhood theory in holding that minors are not
entitled to any special protections, such as access to parents or legal counsel, as preconditions to
valid waivers of Miranda rights granted to subjects of police interrogation. The Court stated:
[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there
has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no
persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether
a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so.
Id. at 725.
8. Wald, supra note 1, at 259.
9. The Supreme Court has not as yet recognized this research.
10. See infra text and notes at 55–61.
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While sometimes attending to empirical studies,11 the Court has
most often simply reached its conclusions, either in protectionist or
personhood terms, without direct appeal to available studies indicating
underlying differences or similarities between young people and
adults.12 Recently, however, in a series of cases disallowing certain
harsh punishments as cruel and unusual when applied to juveniles tried
within the criminal justice system, the Court expressly appealed to research identifying differences between average teenagers and adults.13
Based on these studies, the Court concluded that adolescents up to the
age of eighteen are categorically distinct from adults in terms of their
ability to make mature choices, to think and act as independent agents,
and in terms of their unique transitory personality traits. These distinctions led the Court to conclude that young people lack adult culpability.
The Court’s distinction between adults and adolescents is obviously significant as an Eighth Amendment matter. But recognition of
the distinction could have a broader impact. The punishment cases
mark the Court’s clearest expression yet given of the fact that adolescents are a constitutionally distinct class from adults. Moreover, it supports this conclusion by its most direct and extensive appeal to social
science evidence in all of its juvenile law cases. Indeed, the Court may
have finally answered Bruce Hafen’s concern that the “sensible . . . assertion that adolescents through age eighteen generally lack some fun-

11. See, for example, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75
(2009), where the Court referred to social science research documenting the negative psychological effects of strip searches on young people as support for finding that a strip search of a public
school student violated the Fourth Amendment.
12. See, for example, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979), where the Court stated
the following without support of empirical evidence: “[D]uring the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” For criticism of the Belloti Court’s failure to
attend to scientific studies contrary to the Court’s conclusions, see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1265, 1348 (2000). For a
criticism of the Court’s reliance on “the pages of human experience” rather than on current social
science in its Parham decision, supra note 7, see Gary B. Melton, Children’s Competence to Consent
in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, 1, 9–11 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
13. See infra text and notes 160–206.
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damental forms of capacity” is a proposition in need of empirical support.14
The Court’s finding is clearly protectionist in nature—adolescents
must be protected from harsh punishments imposed on their more
criminally responsible adult counterparts. This scientifically grounded
support of protectionism suggests a possible theoretical basis for a systematic and coherent theory of juvenile rights.15
Without fully considering that question, I undertake in this article
the more modest task of exploring the impact of the punishment cases
in resolving one particular controversial family law issue involving the
possible existence of a juvenile’s constitutional right to engage in sexual conduct prohibited by the state and against the wishes of that juvenile’s parents. While the Supreme Court has seldom decided cases involving direct claims by children of constitutional rights disfavored by
their parents,16 assertions by minors of constitutionally protected sexual liberty have become more prevalent of late in light of the Supreme
Court’s recognition in Lawrence v. Texas of a constitutionally protected
right, at least for adults, to privately engage in consensual sexual intimacy.17
I will examine Lawrence’s possible applicability to minors, taking
into account the Supreme Court’s punishment cases, in an assessment
of the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. I
will show that prior to the Court’s pronouncement of its categorical
adolescent/adult distinction in the punishment cases, the post-Lawrence constitutionality of regulating teenage sexual behavior under fornication statutes was uncertain. With the guidance of the punishment
cases, however, such statutes are clearly constitutional.

14. Bruce C. Hafen, The Learning Years: A Review of The Changing Legal World of Adolescence, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, The Learning Years]. Dean Hafen
raises the concern as a reaction to Franklin Zimring’s proposal, unsupported by empirical data,
recommending defining the age of majority at age eighteen in certain circumstances.
15. Dean Samuel Davis, along with others, notes “the law’s need of a consistent, coherent
position regarding the circumstances under which children ought to be regarded as adults.”
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 28.
16. See infra text and notes 97–102 for an example of such a case.
17. See infra text and notes 240, 245–48.
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I begin with a brief sketch of the personhood and protectionist theories with attention to underlying social science support. I then discuss
the law’s traditional treatment of young people, noting the role played
by chronological age rules, followed by a brief review of the Supreme
Court’s case law defining the constitutional rights of children and their
parents respectively. This review reveals the Court’s general espousal
of protectionism, with rare apparent acknowledgements of juveniles as
full-fledged constitutional persons. A discussion of the punishment
cases then describes the Court’s affirmation of a now scientifically
grounded concept of protectionism. I conclude by relating the punishment cases to post-Lawrence arguments regarding the constitutionality
of state prohibitions of fornication by minors, concluding that such
prohibitions reasonably promote legitimate state and parental interests
and are therefore constitutional.

II.

Protectionism and Personhood: Two Theories of
Rights

While most forms of life embody a process where infants over time
become adult members of the species, human infants are unique, at
least among primates, in their lengthy period of vulnerability and dependence.18 Thus, childhood for humans constitutes a comparatively
long time frame during which young people gradually acquire the
competencies of adulthood.19
Everyone agrees that very young children must be treated paternalistically by the law.20 While the age of majority21 is generally set at
age eighteen,22 some argue that young people as early as age fourteen,

18. See David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1980).
19. Id.
20. For John Stewart Mill, the perception that children are especially vulnerable and dependent requires the law to protect them “against their own actions as well as against external
injury.” JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13–14 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press
1956) (1859).
21. See the discussion of chronological age rules infra at text and notes 73, 176, 192, 280.
22. The eighteen-year-old standard is so ubiquitous as the age of majority that Dean Davis stipulates that throughout his recent book “anyone under [eighteen] years of age is considered
a child and anyone [eighteen] years of age or older is considered an adult.” DAVIS, supra note 2,
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often viewed as the beginning of “adolescence,”23 should enjoy full
rights of adulthood.24 Therefore, advocates of personhood rights generally limit their applicability to adolescents.25 Protectionists, on the
other hand, usually agree that setting the age of majority at eighteen is
a defensible basis for distinguishing those entitled to full legal rights
and responsibilities from those too immature to enjoy full legal personhood.
A.

Protectionism

1. The protectionist concept
Protectionist theory is premised on the idea that children, even adolescents, are different from adults in ways sufficiently significant to
justify denial of rights of autonomy and personhood. The differences
entail, among other things, immature mental competence, and unique
vulnerability and dependence.26 Given these differences, juveniles are
entitled to protection, including rights to receive care, affection, discipline, and guidance, thus enabling their development into mature, responsible adults.27 Also included are rights to be supported, maintained, educated, and provided legal remedies consistent with a
minor’s best interests when obligated caretakers fail to provide the juvenile the protection to which he or she is entitled.28

at 4.
23. Hartman, supra note 12, at 1266–67 (designating “adolescence” as ages approximately
14 through 17 years).
24. See infra text and notes 44–52.
25. Id.
26. MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 10–11 (3d. ed. 2009).
27. See H. Foster & D. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972).
While Foster and Freed develop their “bill of rights” from the premise that children are “persons,” the rights they identify in the text are more at home with protectionist, rather than personhood, philosophy.
28. The court in People v. Scott D., 315 N.E. 2d 466, 469 (N.Y. 1974) offered this summary
of protection rights philosophy: “Children may not be equated with adults for all . . . purposes . . . .
Their natural limitations, varying with age, and the obligation of those, in whose charge they are,
to protect, guide, and if need be, discipline them, are recognized in every kind of society.”
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Defenders of protectionism argue that the denial of full personhood rights is actually essential to a young person’s maturation into
responsible adulthood. Bruce Hafen puts the matter this way, using the
term “choice rights” rather than “personhood rights” as described in
this paper:
The development of the capacity to function as a mature, independent member of society is essential to the meaningful exercise of the
full range of choice rights characteristic of the individual tradition.
Precisely because of their lack of capacity, minors should enjoy legally protected rights to special treatment (including some protection
against their own immaturity) that will optimize their opportunities
for the development of mature capabilities that are in their best interest. Children will outgrow their restricted state, but the more important question is whether they will outgrow it with maximized capacities. An assumption that rational and moral capacity exists, when
in fact it does not exist, may lead to an abandonment of the protections, processes, and opportunities that can develop these very capacities. In this sense, the concept of restricting certain choice rights is
in fact an important form of protection rights. For these reasons,
some distinction between rights of protection and rights of choice
must be preserved.29

Professor Joseph Goldstein notes the value of parental guidance as
a function within the protectionist tradition:
The right to family privacy and parental autonomy, as well as the
reciprocal liberty interest of parent and child in the familial bond between them, need no greater justification than that they comport
with each state’s fundamental constitutional commitment to individual freedom and human dignity. But the right of parents to raise their
children as they think best, free of coercive intervention, comports as
well with each child’s biological and psychological need for unthreatened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents. . . . There is
little doubt that . . . breaches in the familial bond will be detrimental
to a child’s well-being.30

29. Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5, at 650. Franklin Zimring makes a similar
point. “[Eighteen]-year-olds are in the process of becoming adult . . . . To impose full responsibility . . . is much like expecting every new bride to be an instant Betty Crocker. It isn’t realistic and
it isn’t fair.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 20 (2005).
30. Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
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Professor Michael Wald adds that “[c]linicians . . . claim that adolescents benefit from having parental restraints available.”31 He explains:
Such restraints allow adolescents to challenge authority and to explore new areas with the realization that “wise” parents will stop
them if they act in harmful ways. While parents often do not act
wisely, removing the authority structure may be more detrimental
than unwise parental actions . . .
Even if adolescents could make some (or all) decisions without harming themselves significantly, we still might not give autonomy to children because of its disruption of the family system.32

2. Empirical underpinnings
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court until very recently embraced protectionism without any appeal to social science data.33 The
idea that juveniles lack adult competency and maturity was apparently
so widely accepted that empirical support was deemed unnecessary.
However, in the latter half of the 20th century protectionism was
called into question with the emergence of the children’s liberation
movement,34 propelled by research suggesting that adolescents cannot

Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649 (1977). Professor John Coons expresses a similar view:
One may liberate children from the law of man, but the law of nature is beyond repeal.
There is no way to send an eight-year-old out of the sovereignty of the family and into
a world of liberty. For he will there be introduced to a new sovereignty of one kind or
another. It may be a regime of want, ignorance, and general oppression; it may be one
of delightful gratification. The ringmaster could be Fagin or Mary Poppins. Whatever
the reality, it will be created by people with more power, and by the elements. Children—at [least] small children—will not be liberated; they will be dominated . . . .
This is also true even of mature teenagers who might have a ripened capacity for autonomy or at least for autonomy in regard to specific activities such as driving . . . .
John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495,
503 (1985).
31. Wald, supra note 1, at 275.
32. Id. See also Robert J. Levy, The Rights of Parents, 1976 BYU L. REV. 693, for an argument that granting greater rights to adolescents risks upsetting traditional values of family privacy.
33. See supra note 12.
34. The movement is extensively described in Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5.
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be distinguished from adults in terms of decision-making competence,35 prompting calls for granting full personhood rights for adolescents.36
Such calls are controversial, however, in light of recent studies supporting the opposite view that, in general, adolescents differ from average adults in legally significant ways. This evidence, relied upon by
the Supreme Court in the punishment cases,37 can be summarized as
follows:
Scientific evidence indicates that teens make less competent decisions compared with adults because they are developmentally immature.38 Adolescents lack the capacity for “autonomous choice, selfmanagement, risk perception and calculation of future consequences”
when compared to adults; these traits lead to risky behavior.39 Adolescence is also a developmental period in which personal identity and
character fluctuate “through a process of exploration and experimentation.”40
Moreover, adolescents tend to respond to peer influence more
than adults.41 Indeed, adolescents succumb to peer influence both “directly,” when subjected to peer-pressure to conform behavior, and “indirectly,” when seeking peer approval in decision making.42

35. See infra text and notes 53-61.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 162-206 and accompanying text.
38.
(2003).

Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Texas L. Rev. 799, 801

39. Id.
40. Id. The social science literature on the subject of adolescence is considerable. This
Article addresses only a small sample of the data.
41. Elizabeth S. Scott, et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts,
19 Law & Hum. Behav. 221, 230 (1995). See also Christopher Slobogin, et al; A Prevention
Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wisc. L. Rev.
185, 196–200 (summarizing evidence supporting the view that adolescents are excessive risk-takers, focus more on short-term consequences of actions and less on long-term impacts than do
adults, and are more susceptible than adults to peer influence). This research suggests that “the
average adolescent . . . differs from the average adult in ways that diminish willingness to pay
attention to the criminal law.” Id. at 196.
42. See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230. See infra, note 231, referencing the direct/indirect peer pressure distinction.
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Because they tend to feel invulnerable,43 adolescents also engage in
riskier behavior than adults in activities such as “criminal conduct, unprotected sex, and speeding.”44 That the Supreme Court has blest such
evidence of youthful immaturity in the punishment cases constitutes a
significant affirmation of the protectionist tradition.45
B. The Personhood Rights
1. The personhood conception
Advocates of personhood rights routinely focus on data suggesting
that the average adolescent’s cognitive development and moral reasoning skills correspond with the average adult’s. Therefore, because adolescents utilize adult reasoning capabilities, they should, on this view,
enjoy adult rights enforceable against their parents as well as the state.
Professor Robert Batey argues:
From the assumption that adolescents lack the capacity to make
moral choices affecting their own lives, Anglo-American jurisprudence has drawn the conclusion that the adolescent’s parents have
the right to make those choices. The conclusion that parents have the
right to make the adolescent’s moral choices must be rejected, however, because, as studies indicate, the law’s underlying assumption
that adolescents lack the capacity to make moral choices is incorrect.
Because a large majority of adolescents do have the moral reasoning
capacities of adults, the law should accord the considered choices of
competent adolescents the same treatment it accords similar choices
of adults . . .
If parents can force decisions on adolescents, the courts should
provide some mechanism to enable competent adolescents to overturn those decisions. Similarly, if parents can veto decisions made by
their adolescent children, those children should be able to obtain judicial assistance in overriding such vetoes, unless the parents can
demonstrate that the child did not make a mature choice. . . . Recognition of the adolescent’s capacity for adult moral reasoning . . . requires . . . the court [to] enjoin the parents from interfering unless

43. See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230; Slobogin, supra note 41, at 198.
44. See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230.
45. See infra notes 162–206 and accompanying text.
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the parents can establish that the adolescent has made an immature
judgment.46

Batey is not alone in espousing the proposition that “the law should
accord the considered choices of competent adolescents the same
treatment it accords similar choices of adults.”47 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder48—a case holding that the religious practice rights of Amish parents entitled them to withdraw their children from public schools in
violation of state compulsory education laws in order for the children
to live full time in the Amish religious community—Justice William
Douglas observed in his dissenting opinion that “children . . . have
constitutionally protected interests.”49 Relying on “substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and
intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult,”50
Justice Douglas concluded:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon
their children. Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s rights
to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views. . . . [I]f an
Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to
have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the
parents’ religiously motivated objections.51

Douglas went on to claim that children should be “masters of their
own destiny,” at least so far as educational choices are concerned.52
Similarly, other personhood theorists have argued for such things as a
“right to emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that
relationship has broken down and the child has left home due to . . .

46. Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 370, 378 (1982).
Some personhood advocates go even further than Batey. Richard Farson, for example, argues that
children should receive full civil rights at birth. Farson’s views are noted in FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING WORLD OF LEGAL ADOLESCENCE 23 (2005).
47. Batey, supra note 46, at 373.
48. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 245, n.3.
51. Id. at 242.
52. Id. at 245.
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serious family conflict,”53 as well as a right for adolescents to be sexually active as a matter of “personal autonomy in making strategic life
decisions.”54
2. Empirical underpinnings
As noted above, personhood advocates rely on studies suggesting
that nothing distinguishes adolescent decision making competency
from adults. A commentator summarized the existing social science literature as follows:
[The] studies . . . suggest that adolescents, aged 14 and older, possess
the cognitive capability to reason, understand, appreciate, and articulate decisions comparable to young adults. Perhaps more significantly, there is a paucity of scientific or social science study that supports the present legal view of adolescent incapacity. Despite the
statistical and scientific evidence, which merits serious consideration
by policy makers, the principle of decisional incapacity is the raison
[d’être] for law and the lack of a coherent legal approach for accommodating adolescent issues. A backward glance over the twentieth
century reveals a promising legacy for the recognition of adolescent
autonomous rights. Realizing more meaningful exercise of those
rights should be a legacy for the twenty-first century.55

The studies suggest that when presented with difficult problems of
moral reasoning, adolescents perform better than younger children
and roughly on a par with adults.56
For some, these findings mean that the law’s conclusions that adolescents generally differ from adults in the exercise of moral reasoning skills57 are “simply . . . wrong.”58 One social scientist has argued the
following concerning the legal consequences that should result from

53. Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343,
347 (1972).
54. Richards, supra note 18, at 54–55. For an argument espousing a presumption of adolescent “decisional ability” rather than inability, see generally Hartman, supra note 12.
55. Hartman, supra note 12, at 1286.
56. See, e.g., Batey, supra note 46, at 364–70.
57. For a clear statement of the traditional view that adolescents differ from adults in
reasoning skills, see the quote from the Parham case, supra note 7.
58. Batey, supra note 46, at 369.
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these studies:
I am arguing that adolescents’ personhood should be recognized by
policymakers. Insofar as denial of autonomy has been based on assumptions of incompetence, current psychological research does not
support such an age-graded distinction. Moreover, . . . recognition of
personhood might facilitate adolescents’ personal individuation. . . .
[T]here seems to be ample basis for reversal of current presumptions
in favor of a view of adolescents as autonomous persons possessed of
independent interests regarding liberty and privacy.59

Personhood advocates sometimes cite empirical evidence questioning the scientific support for other commonly assumed differences
between adolescents and adults. For example, some claim that the
“prevailing myth” of excessive adolescent risk taking has been “debunked by researchers” who have supposedly established that risk-taking activities of adolescents do not exceed those of adults.60 Along the
same lines, some urge that feelings of invulnerability, a precursor to
risk-taking actions, are “no more pronounced among adolescents than
among adults.”61
C. Protectionist and Personhood Rights?
Recently, commentators have begun to argue that adolescents possess protectionist rights in some contexts and personhood rights in
others. From the studies showing that, by the early teen years, adolescents’ general cognitive abilities are essentially indistinguishable from
those of adults, some maintain that in situations requiring “logical reasoning about moral, social, and interpersonal matters,” adolescents
should therefore be treated as legal adults.62 Supposedly, such a view
does not dispute the validity of the studies demonstrating the develop-

59. Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in
Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 102 (1983).
60. Hartman, supra note 12, at 1348–49, n. 346. But see supra text at notes 38–40.
61. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995).
62. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583,
586 (2009).
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mental immaturity of adolescents regarding propensities for risk-taking and extraordinary peer influence. Hence, in situations where rash
decisions are made, adolescents often act immaturely and thus should
not be considered adults for legal purposes.63 Consequently, in spur of
the moment situations like those involved in most juvenile crime, adolescents lack adult culpability necessitating protection from harsh
punishments imposed on adults.64 On the other hand, in situations
where deliberate decision making is involved, in deliberations about
healthcare for example, adolescents arguably function as autonomous
persons.65
D. Summary
The above discussion demonstrates that attention to social science
studies on the nature of adolescence may lead to two different conceptions of rights. First, protectionism finds support from studies showing
adolescents uniquely prone to risk-taking behavior, to be more susceptible to peer-pressure, and less able to assess the future consequences
of their actions than adults. Second, personhood advocates justify their
position by appeal to studies showing adolescent/adult equivalence in
competently making decisions in contexts of unhurried deliberation.

III. Constitutional Rights of Adolescents and Their
Parents
Throughout the history of Anglo-American law, young people
have been treated as a distinct class for legal purposes.66 At common
law, an “infant” was any person under the age of twenty-one.67 Chronological age rules defined the status of minority without regard to individualized characteristics such as physical maturity, mental capacity,
education, experience, or accomplishment.68 Such rules continue to be
the primary vehicle for determining adult legal status, although the age

63. Id.
64. Id. at 593.
65. Id. at 592.
66. GARDNER, supra note 26, at 3–4.
67. See e.g., Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392, 396 (Me. 1976).
68. See, e.g., Hartwell v. Cooper, 380 P.2d 591, 592 (Alaska 1963).
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of majority is not defined by a single age for all purposes.69 With the
passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment allowing eighteen-year-olds
the right to vote,70 most states have statutorily reduced the general age
of majority to age eighteen.71
Defining legal adulthood in terms of chronological age standards
is controversial for some. Everyone agrees that arriving at adulthood
is a process and not the function of reaching a particular birthday. Not
all young people become mature and responsible adults at the same
age. Moreover, the emergence of the social science data on adolescent
decision making discussed above72 has led to a call in some quarters to
abandon chronological rules in favor of individualized assessments of
competency as the means for determining adult legal status.73 Nevertheless, while current law does employ a few manifestations of the individualized approach,74 legal adulthood continues to be determined
almost exclusively by chronological age rules.75 Thus, it is most often
in the context of such rules that the Supreme Court has addressed constitutional claims of young people, which occasionally conflict with the
desires of their parents.
In determining the constitutional rights of children and parents
respectively, it is helpful to be sensitive to how the three parties—state,
parent, and child—align. For instance, when the interests of the parent
and the child are united against the state whose action is found unconstitutional, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the right denied is

69. For example, states generally permit young people to operate motor vehicles at an
earlier age than the general age of majority while not allowing them to consume alcohol until age
twenty-one. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at 4.
70. “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
71. GARDNER, supra note 26, at 4.
72. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. Individualized assessments of competency are routinely made by juvenile court judges
in making decisions whether to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile to criminal court. See DAVIS,
supra note 2, at 335–41. See also the discussion of “judicial bypass” mechanisms in abortion cases
infra at notes 135–36 and accompanying text. For a criticism of the judicial bypass approach, see
Hafen, The Learning Years, supra note 14, at 1059.
75. For a defense of the chronological age rule approach, see Hafen, The Learning Years,
supra note 14, at 1059. See also infra at notes 172, 188, 276.
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that of the parent, or the child, or both.76
The following discussion of Supreme Court cases is not intended
to be exhaustive. The sample sufficiently demonstrates, however, the
predominance of the protectionist point of view, and the rare exceptions that arguably recognize personhood rights.
A.

Protectionism

As early as its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Pierce,77 the Supreme Court
has alluded to the fact that children have constitutional rights. In invalidating a statute that forbade the teaching of any language other
than English until the eighth grade, the Meyer Court opined that constitutionally protected liberty included not only the right of teachers
to “engage in any of the common occupations of life,” and parents to
“bring up children,” but also the right of the individual [presumably
including children] to acquire useful knowledge.78 Twenty-one years
after Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters79 declared unconstitutional a statute requiring children between ages eight and sixteen to
attend public schools rather than private parochial or military schools.
In language similar to Meyer, the Pierce Court found the statute an unreasonable interference “with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children.”80
If Meyer gave a nod in the direction of constitutional rights of children, Prince v. Massachusetts81 decided in 1944 made clear that certain

76. See, e.g., the discussion of the Meyer case, infra text and notes 77–78.
77. Meyer v. Pierce, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. Id. at 399. Assuming that Meyer does articulate an independent right in children to
“acquire knowledge,” the right could be understood as a protectionist right. Education of children is a necessity in the maturation process toward adulthood. Consistent with the idea, the
Meyer Court noted that it was “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.” Id. at 400. The Supreme Court would later hold, however, that education is not a “fundamental right” entitled to strict constitutional scrutiny. San Antonio Public
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
79. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
80. Id. at 534–35. The Court added that the “child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535.
81. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 159 (1944).
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rights available to adults are not granted to children.82 Despite the fact
that “[i]t is cardinal . . . that the custody care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents,”83 the Prince Court held that a Jehovah’s
Witness aunt could constitutionally be punished for permitting her
nine-year-old niece to attempt to sell religious literature on a public
street in violation of a state child labor statute prohibiting aiding a “girl
under eighteen” in selling or offering to sell “any article” in a public
place.84 Even though both the aunt and niece were ordained ministers
and were engaging in a religious exercise by attempting to sell the literature, the Court found no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.85
While recognizing that the aunt had a constitutional right to proselytize on the street, the niece had no similar right, as explained by the
Court:
Street preaching . . . for adults . . . cannot be wholly prohibited. . . .
The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other
matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough for
adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially
of tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated,
of emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury. Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves.86

82. Various other Supreme Court cases recognize the proposition that juveniles are not
entitled to the same constitutional rights as adults. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (upholding a juvenile obscenity statute proscribing material that would not be obscene for
adults); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying the right to trial by jury in
juvenile court delinquency adjudications while such right exists in adult criminal trials); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying the “reasonable suspicion” Fourth Amendment
standard to searches of school students rather than the more rigorous “probable cause” test often
required for searches outside schools).
83. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
84. Id. at 160–61, 170–71.
85. Id. at 170.
86. Id. at 169–70. Notwithstanding its language that children are too young “to make the
choice” to practice religion, the Prince Court mentioned “the rights of children to exercise their
religion and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of
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The obvious protectionism of Prince87 is carried forward in most of
the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing the constitutional rights of
juveniles.88 For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder89 the Court reiterated
“the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring”90 in
holding that a state statute, requiring parents to enroll their children
in public or private school until age sixteen, could not be applied to
Amish parents who withdrew their children from school at age fourteen for religious purposes.91 The Court dismissed the argument that
exempting Amish children from the compulsory education requirement denied a “right of the Amish child to a secondary education,”
emphasizing that it was the parents who were subject to prosecution
under the statute.92
In response to Justice Douglas’s claim in dissent that the wishes of
the Amish children should be assessed before their parents were permitted to withdraw them from school,93 the Court suggested that the

religious belief.” Id. at 165. The Court identified the authority for these rights as West Virginia
St. Bd. of Educ.v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), a case finding a state statutory requirement that
school children salute the flag and pronounce the Pledge of Allegiance violative of the religious
rights of Jehovah’s Witness students, and arguably their parents. 321 U.S. at 165–66. It is not
entirely clear, however, that Barnette recognized an independent right in the students to practice
their chosen religion given the fact that the students and their parents shared the same religious
belief.
87. The Prince Court noted that “the state as parens patriae” may act to “guard . . . the
wellbeing” of youth, even sometimes where the state action restricts a parent’s control. Id. at 166.
The Court emphasized that its “ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents.” Id. at
171.
88. For a thorough documentation of the Court’s virtually exclusive adherence to protectionism in cases decided during the first three quarters of the Twentieth Century, see generally
Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5. See also, Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at
511 (“Most of the Court’s children’s rights cases have dealt with . . . “protection rights” rather
than “choice rights”). Dean Hafen has concluded that the “cases recognizing a choice [personhood] right for minors are essentially limited to those dealing with abortion.” Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 512.
89. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
90. Id. at 213.
91. Id. at 235–36.
92. Id. at 229–30.
93. Id. at 230–31, 241–46. Douglas intimated that the children should be able to assert
their claims against their parents:
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children’s opinions were irrelevant:
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible
competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor
children from attending high school despite their expressed desires
to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of
parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their
minor children recognized in this Court’s past decisions. It is clear
that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of
religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom . . . On this record we neither reach nor decide those issues.94

The Court was content to rest its decision on the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control” under Meyer95 and on the “rights of parents to
direct religious upbringing of their children” under Pierce.96
In Parham v. J.R., a rare case of a minor asserting a constitutional
claim against his parent, the Court considered whether an adversary
proceeding was required where a parent sought her child’s admission
to a state mental hospital.97 While recognizing that such children pos-

On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitled
to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family,
the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views.
He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will
have to break from the Amish tradition.
Id. at 244–45.
94. Id. at 231–32.
95. Id. at 232–33. The Court found that living under the Amish way of life was in no way
harmful to Amish children, in fact, their system of “learning-by-doing” prepared with an ideal
vocational training. Id. at 223–25.
96. Id. at 233.
97. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham also involved non-parent guardians who
sought hospitalization of children in their charge.
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sess constitutionally protected liberty interests in not being unnecessarily confined,98 the Court found that the parental interest in obtaining mental health care for their children predominated.99 Noting the
“traditional presumption that parents act in the best interests of their
child,”100 the Court took a clearly protectionist stance in stating that
“[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for
medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.”101 Moreover, the Court was reluctant to require adversarial
proceedings, which would entail the child, through counsel, “to probe
the motives” of her parents, thus involving the Courts in “private family matters” in determining whether the child should be admitted to
the hospital.102
A final example of the Court’s commitment to protectionism is reflected in its cases granting procedural rights to defendants in juvenile
court waiver and adjudication proceedings.103 In imposing procedural
protections on a juvenile justice system historically eschewing virtually
all procedural formalities, the Court did not equate juveniles with
adults,104 but instead recognized that minority status did not justify adjudication in “kangaroo courts.”105 Indeed, the Court eventually gave

98. Id. at 600. The Court noted that a child has a “substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment” which might produce “adverse social consequences for the child” through being stigmatized as one having been hospitalized for psychiatric
care.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 603. The Court offered no empirical support for its conclusion and made no
reference to the emerging data regarding the cognitive competence of adolescents. See supra text
and notes 53–59; Melton, supra note 12.
102. Parham, 442 U.S. at 605.
103. For a summary of these decisions, see Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and
Public Trials by Jury; Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1,
25–34 (2012) [Hereinafter Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice].
104. Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 511–12.
105. See e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (“[T]he condition of a boy does not justify
a kangaroo court”).
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its blessing to a continuation of a juvenile court system dedicated to
addressing the unique needs of young people.106
B. Protectionist or Personhood?
Unlike the cases just discussed, some of the Court’s cases are ambiguous, suggesting either a protectionist or personhood interpretation. Tinker v. Des Moines School District107 represents such a case.108
Tinker involved a group of parents who organized an effort to protest
the Vietnam War, encouraging their children to participate by wearing
black armbands to school in violation of a school regulation forbidding
such activity.109 The students were suspended from school for violating
the rule and defended their actions by arguing that the rule violated
their First Amendment rights to free speech.110 The Supreme Court
agreed, stating that students as “persons’ under our Constitution”111 do
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”112
Tinker has generally been understood as a case granting personhood rights to students to express political viewpoints at school.113
Some, however, read the case as a parents’ rights case implicating both
the child-rearing and free speech rights of the parents.114

106. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971), a plurality of the Court noted
that it was “reluctant to say that . . . [the juvenile court system] still does not hold promise.” The
plurality encouraged the states to “seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the
problems of the young.” Id.
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
108. The ambiguous nature of Tinker is no better illustrated than by noting Dean Samuel
Davis’s interpretation(s) of the case. On the one hand, Davis characterizes the case as the Supreme Court’s “first ‘pure’ children’s rights case.” DAVIS, supra note 2, at 45. On the other hand,
Dean Davis observes that the case could be viewed as “a parents’ rights or family rights case . . . .”
Id. at 47.
109. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
110. Id. at 504–05.
111. Id. at 511.
112. Id. at 506.
113. See, e.g., SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 21–
23 (3d ed. 2008).
114. Given the fact that the views of the students mirrored those of the parents in Tinker,
“one might ask whether the Court would be as protective of children’s rights if their views were
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If Tinker is a personhood rights case, its significance as such has
waned with subsequent decisions. Tinker has been characterized as the
“high-water mark in children’s rights in the Supreme Court.”115 In
subsequent school cases the Court has expressed protectionist principles in denying student free speech claims in contexts of student assemblies,116 school newspapers,117 and a student’s display of a controversial banner during the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay.118 Similarly, in

contrary to parental wishes.” DAVIS, supra note 2, at 47. See also Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra
note 4, at 512 (“[B]oth childrearing and the free speech rights of the Tinker parents were arguably
implicated in the case.”).
115. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 113, at 23–28. But see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc.,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (recognizing First Amendment rights of minors to access violent video
games).
116. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The Fraser Court rejected the claims
of a student (Fraser) who argued that his rights to free speech were violated when school officials
suspended him for giving a speech deemed inappropriate during a school assembly. The speech,
presented to nominate a fellow student for a student government office, was laced with sexual
innuendo that the officials viewed as violative of a school rule providing “conduct which . . .
interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” Id. at 678. The Court distinguished Tinker as a case involving political discourse, unlike Fraser’s speech, and found that the school had an interest in preparing students
for citizenship by inculcating “habits and manners of civility.” Id. at 681. The Court further observed that school authorities act in loco parentis in protecting its student body “from exposure to
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech. Id. at 634. See, Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students
Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49 (1996),
and Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as
Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1987), for defenses of student rights as grounded in
protectionism rather than personhood
117. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Kuhlmeir, the Court upheld the actions of a school principal who exercised editorial control over the contents of articles
written by student staff members for their school newspaper. Id. at 263–64. The Court rejected
First Amendment claims of the students after the principle deleted the articles, viewing them as
offensive and inappropriate, in an attempt to protect immature students who were part of the
audience for the newspaper. Id. at 267–73.
118. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). The Morse Court upheld the actions of a
principal who suspended students who refused to take down a banner reading “BONG HITS 4
JESUS,” which the principal considered to advocate illegal drug use. Id. at 397–98. The Court
found that the principal had a responsibility to protect students from speech that reasonably could
be regarded as advocating illegal drug use, a responsibility that outweighed the students’ claims
that the banner constituted protected speech. Id. at 408–10.

22

GARDNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

2/13/2014 11:41 AM

The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and Adults

school search and seizure cases the Court has accorded less than full
Fourth Amendment protection to students, recognizing broad power
in educators to oversee the school environment.119
Like Tinker, Carey v. Population Services International120 is a case that
some understand as recognizing personhood rights but others see as
grounded in protectionism. In Carey, the Supreme Court struck down
a New York statute banning, inter alia, distribution of contraceptives
to anyone under age sixteen.121 The Court rejected the State’s argument that prohibiting access of contraceptives constituted a constitutionally permissible regulation of promiscuous sexual activity among
the young.122 A plurality of Justices noted that “[s]tate restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve . . . ‘[a]
significant state interest that is not present in the case of an adult.’”123
Finding that the “right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults,”124 the plurality125 ruled that the statute could not reasonably achieve the State interest of deterring sexual activity.126 However, the Court left open the

119. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
applies to schools but is subject to a “reasonable suspicion” standard rather than the traditional
“probable cause” test, in part because students enjoy lesser privacy expectation). See Martin R.
Gardner, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools: Observations on an Unsettled State of Search
and Seizure Law, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 373, 374–380 (2000), for an argument that T.L.O. grants
broad deference to school officials to search students and minimal privacy protection to students.
See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random urinalysis
searches of all athletes at a high school). The Acton Court found minimal student privacy interests
involved in the case and saw the school as the temporary custodian of its students which for many
purposes “act[s] in loco parentis.” Id. at 655; Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding a requirement for all students participating in any extracurricular activity to consent to a
urinalysis search). But see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (finding
strip search of student violates Fourth Amendment).
120. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
121. Id. at 681–82.
122. Id. at 691–96.
123. Id. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 128–134).
124. Id.
125. Only Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun recognized the privacy right
extension to minors. Id. at 691 n.12.
126. Id. at 695.
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question of whether discouraging sexual activity of minors was itself an
unconstitutional infringement of protected privacy, observing that its
“decision proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not
bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors.”127 At the same
time the Court noted that access to contraceptives “is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of
childbearing.”128 Thus, the Court was clear that minors have a constitutional right to possess contraceptives, which they may or may not
have a constitutional right to use. Concurring Justices White and Stevens specified where they stood on whether minors have a privacy right
to engage in premarital sexual activity, viewing as “frivolous” the argument that a minor has a constitutional right “to put contraceptives to
their intended use notwithstanding the combined objection of both
parents and the State.”129
While some interpret Carey demonstrating the Court’s support of
a minor’s “right to decide whether or not to beget a child,”130 others
see the case as grounded in protectionism, claiming that Carey reflects
the Court’s belief that the statute did not grant a “right to procreation,”131 but rather failed to deter sexual activity of minors. On this
view, the “real fear” in Carey was that the denial of contraceptives left
sexually active minors unprotected from the risks of “unwanted preg-

127. Id. at 694 n.17.
128. Id. at 688. In a dissenting opinion in a later case, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White noted that “[m]inors. . . enjoy a right of privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation,” claiming that “it is not settled that a State may rely on a pregnancy-prevention
justification to make consensual sexual intercourse among minors a criminal act.” Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 491 n.5 (1981) (upholding California’s statutory rape provision
punishing only males against an equal protection challenge) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In the context of an adult attack on a state fornication statute, one court remarked that “[n]ecessarily implicit in the right to make decisions regarding childbearing is the right to engage in
sexual intercourse.” Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev’d on other grounds,
782 F. 2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 702–03 (White, J., concurring, quoting Stevens, J., concurring at 713).
130. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 2, at 88.
131. See, e.g., Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 512.
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nancy and venereal disease”132 thus rendering Carey a “protection
rights case.”133
C. Personhood Rights—the Abortion Cases
It is widely understood that certain cases granting minor women
the right to terminate their pregnancies constitute the clearest, if not
the only, examples of Supreme Court recognition of juvenile personhood rights.134 The leading case is Planned Parenthood v. Danforth in
which the Court invalidated a state statute that, inter alia, conditioned
a minor’s ability to obtain an abortion on the consent of her parent.135
Viewing the case as “an anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade,”136 the
Planned Parenthood Court found that “[m]inors as well as adults . . .
possess constitutional rights.”137 The Court rejected the argument that
permitting a minor to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an
adult having responsibility for the child would be an abdication of “the
State’s duty to protect the welfare of minors,”138 declaring that “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”139 Permitting minors to obtain abortions without parental consent posed no threat to
parental authority or family unity in the eyes of the Court. Judging the
privacy right of the minor to be at least the equivalent of her parents’
rights to rear their child, the Court proclaimed: “Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter’s

132. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part)).
133. Id. at 513.
134. See, e.g., id. at 514: “[T]he right of minors to obtain abortions without parental consent has become the major exception to the Court’s overall posture [against] granting [personhood] rights to minors.”
135. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
136. Id. at 55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing an unfettered right of privacy
for pregnant women to decide with her physician to terminate her pregnancy during the first
trimester of the pregnancy).
137. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 74.
138. Id. at 72–73 (quoting Brief for Appellee Danforth at 44).
139. Id. at 74.
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pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”140
Planned Parenthood did not establish that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, is entitled to give effective consent for termination of
her pregnancy. In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court recognized that some
pregnant minors may in fact be too immature to make the abortion
decision.141 Therefore, the Court authorized a procedure for a pregnant minor to bypass her parents and obtain judicial consent for an
abortion by demonstrating either that (1) she is sufficiently mature to
make an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy or (2) that even
if she is incapable of making her own decision an abortion would be in
her best interests.142
Despite Bellotti’s seeming recognition of personhood rights, Justice
Powell in his plurality opinion for the Court observed that while minors are “not beyond the protection of the constitution,” their “peculiar vulnerability [,] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner [,] and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing” meant that “the constitutional rights of children cannot
be equated with those of adults.”143 Further justifying the need for judicial oversight of the abortion decision, the Court voiced a view sim-

140. Id. at 75. The Court’s views are in sharp contrast to those taken in the Parham case.
See supra text and notes 68–73. Planned Parenthood may appear at first glance as a clear accommodation to “pro-choice” advocates of abortion rights. However, had the case recognized a parent’s
right to veto their daughter’s decisions to terminate her pregnancy, it would follow that a corresponding parental right would exist to impose an abortion on a daughter desiring to have her baby.
See Hartman, supra note 12, at 1346–47. Such a situation would clearly be offensive to “pro-life”
interests. For a case holding that a mother could not invoke state status offense jurisdiction over
“incorrigible, ungovernable, and habitually disobedient” children because of her daughter’s refusal to have an abortion, see In re Mary P., 444 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). The Court
found that Planned Parenthood’s privacy protections extend not only to a right to abort but also to
“the decision to give birth.” Id. at 547.
141. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
142. Id. at 643–44, 647–48.
143. Id. at 633–34. For criticism of these views as “dubious in light of scientific studies
suggesting adolescent decisional ability,” see Hartman, supra note 12, at 1348; see also supra text
accompanying notes 55–61.
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ilar to that later expressed in Parham, again with no empirical support:144 “[A]dolescen[ts] . . . often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them.”145
Bellotti thus blest a system that assessed, on a case-by-case basis,146
the maturity of minors seeking to terminate their pregnancies. Those
found sufficiently mature are granted the personhood right to make
their own decision, while those deemed immature are protected by a
judicial judgment promoting “her best interests.”147
Significantly, the Bellotti Court suggested that recognition of a minor’s personhood rights might be limited to the abortion context, noting that the abortion decision “differs in important ways from other
decisions that may be made during minority.”148 Unlike other rights,
such as marriage that are denied minors only temporarily, “a pregnant
adolescent cannot preserve . . . for long the possibility of aborting,
which effectively expires in a matter of weeks after the onset of pregnancy.”149 Moreover, “unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor,” given likely lack of education, employment
skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity.150 “In sum,” noted
the Court, “there are few situations in which denying a minor the right
to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and
indelible.”151
D.

Parental Rights

As the above discussion makes clear, the Supreme Court has long
recognized parents’ rights to raise their children and to make decisions

144. See supra text accompanying notes 97–102
145. Parham v. J.R., 443 U.S. at 635 (1979).
146. Such an individualized assessment of maturity constitutes a sharp break from the traditional appeal to chronological age as defining adulthood. See supra text accompanying notes
68–73.
147. Parham, 443 U.S. at 647–48.
148. Id. at 642.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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in their behalf.152 Except in the contexts of abortion,153 and state interventions made necessary in cases of parental neglect or abuse,154 these
rights are generally honored as essential to the child’s maturation to
responsible adulthood. In summarizing its case law, the Court observed that “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.”155
Even in the context of abortion, where states have imposed parental
notification requirements prior to a minor’s abortion, the Court has
recognized a parental role in participating in the abortion decision as
consistent with “the important considerations of family integrity and
protecting adolescents.”156
In a case dealing with the rights of an unwed father to a parental
relationship with his children, impeded by a statute making the children wards of the state upon the death of their mother,157 the Court
said:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children “come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements.”158

152. See supra text accompanying notes77–80, 89–102.
153. See supra text accompanying notes134–140.
154. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 165–75.
155. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639 (1968)).
156. Id. at 411. The Court made the statement assuming that minors were “immature and
dependent.” Id. See also Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
(upholding a parental notification statute which provided a judicial bypass procedure for pregnant
minors who establish that (1) they are sufficiently mature to make an intelligent decision to terminate their pregnancies without notice to their parents or (2) that they have suffered abuse at
the hands of their parents).
157. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77,
95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
158. Id. at 651.
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In a subsequent case, the Court described parental rights as the
“care, custody, and control of their children” as “perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”159 Such
statements, as well as the general protectionist tenor of the Court’s
juvenile rights cases, make clear that a child faces substantial difficulties
in successfully asserting constitutional claims that conflict with her
parents’ reasonable attempts to care for, protect, and control the child.

IV. The Juvenile Punishment Cases
In sharp contrast to the cases discussed in the previous section—
where the Supreme Court made no attempt to ground its decisions in
social science data—in a series of cases deciding Eighth Amendment
issues, the Court directly appealed to empirical data in finding adolescents to be categorically different from adults for purposes of Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis.160 The following review of
the punishment cases will describe the Court’s view of the nature of
adolescence and address whether that view may extend beyond the
context of criminal punishment to other areas of juvenile law.
A.

The Death Penalty Cases

In the first in a series of cases questioning the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty on criminal defendants161 who committed
murder while juveniles, the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma162 held that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
forbids inflicting capital punishment on offenders who commit murder
when fifteen-years-old or younger. In finding that children that young

159. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (statute permitting “any person” to petition for rights to visit minor children held to be an unconstitutional violation of parental rights).
160. See Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 369 (2006).
161. The cases all involve criminal, rather than juvenile, court convictions. For a discussion
of various mechanisms for waiving jurisdiction from juvenile to criminal court, see GARDNER,
supra note 26, at 188–90.
162. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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are not capable of acting with sufficient culpability to justify the ultimate penalty, the Court163 appealed to “the experience of mankind” as
evidence of the differences that exist between young people and adults,
which must be acknowledged in determining the rights and duties of
minors and adults respectively.164 The Court observed that there is
“broad agreement” that adolescents are “less mature and responsible
than adults.”165 They are also “more vulnerable, more impulsive and
less self-disciplined than adults.”166 Thus, less culpability should attach
to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. While the basis for this conclusion was “too obvious to require extended explanation,”167 the Court nevertheless explained “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.”168 Interestingly, the
Court footnoted a host of social science data supporting its conclusions
about adolescents but did not directly relate the studies to its analysis.169
The social science data referenced in Thompson burst to the forefront in Roper v. Simmons,170 which held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of offenders who were under age eighteen at the

163. A four-justice plurality issued the opinion for the Court.
164. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824–25. In addition to its conclusion that adolescents are less
culpable than adults, the Court also grounded its holding on the “evolving standards of decency”
as reflected by the reluctance of state legislatures and juries to impose the death penalty on offenders under age sixteen who commit capital crimes. Id. at 821–31.
165. Id. at 834.
166. Id. (quoting 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing
Policy Toward Young Offenders as quoted in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11
(1982)).
167. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
168. Id.
169. “The . . . decision in Thompson does not speak explicitly in the language of adolescent
development or support its arguments with scientific research on adolescents’ capacities.” Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013
(2003).
170. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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time they committed capital crimes.171 The infrequency of state imposition of the death penalty on juveniles,172 coupled with empirical evidence suggesting differences between adolescents and adults, convinced the Court that juveniles are “categorically less culpable” than
average adult offenders,173 thus rendering them immune from the
death penalty.
Appealing directly to recent studies, the Court identified three
general characteristics of adolescents that differentiate them from
adults: (1) “[a] lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility”174 manifesting itself in propensities to engage in reckless behavior and impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; (2) a vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) less character development
than adults with more transitory, and fewer fixed, personality traits.175
Rejecting traditional arguments in favor of case-by-case assessments in
assessing culpability in administering the death penalty,176 the Court
concluded: “The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are
too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”177
In addition to lack of culpability, the Court emphasized that due
to the transitory nature of their character development, adolescent offenders are uniquely amenable to rehabilitation. The Court noted that
“it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of

171. Between the time of Thompson and Roper, the Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld imposition of the death penalty for murderers who were sixteen or seventeen-years-old at the time of their crimes. Justice Scalia dismissed as “ethicoscientific” an array of evidence similar to that cited in Thompson showing the differences between
adolescents and adults. Id. at 377–78. On the other hand, Justice Brennan in dissent was persuaded by studies showing that adolescents have less capacity than adults “to think in long range
terms,” while having “little fear of death,” and possessing “a profound conviction of their own . . .
immortality.” Id. at 404–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67.
173. Id. at 567.
174. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359–62, (1993).
175. Id. at 569–70.
176. Id. at 572.
177. Id. at 572–73.
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an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”178
In fashioning its categorical rule, the Court argued that fixing the
line for eligibility for the death penalty at age eighteen was not an arbitrary choice,179 noting that in light of the transitory personality development of adolescents, psychiatrists are subject to a rule forbidding
them from diagnosing any patient under age eighteen as having a personality disorder.180 Moreover, the “age of eighteen is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”181
Justice Scalia in dissent called into question the Court’s appeal to
social science evidence. In addition to raising questions about possible
methodological problems with the studies,182 Scalia cited the studies
described above—for him contradicting the Court’s conclusion that
adolescents lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions—showing that “by middle adolescence (age 14–15) young people
develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas,
understanding social rules and laws, and reasoning about interpersonal
relationships and interpersonal problems.”183 Scalia also chided the
Court for its categorical rule, claiming that the studies cited by the
Court offer “scant support” for a categorical prohibition, showing at

178. Id. at 570.
179. Observing that “the relevant differences between “adults” and “juveniles” appear to
be a matter of degree rather than of kind,” Justice O’Connor in dissent disagreed:
Chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and
common experience suggests that many 17-year-olds are more mature than the average young “adult.” In short, the class of offenders exempted from capital punishment
by today’s decision is too broad and too diverse to warrant a categorical prohibition.
Indeed, the age-based line drawn by the Court is indefensibly arbitrary—it quite likely
will protect a number of offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death penalty
and may well leave vulnerable many who are not.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 600–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 573.
181. Id. at 574.
182. Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 617–18 (citing Brief for APA as Amicus Curiae, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.
S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805) at pp. 19–20 (citations omitted)). See supra text accompanying notes
55–61 for a discussion of the studies.
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most that “on average . . . persons under 18 are unable to take responsibility for their actions,” and not that “all individuals under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes.”184 Citing Bellotti and
Planned Parenthood,185 Scalia observed that “at least some minors will
be mature enough to make difficult decisions that involve moral considerations,” concluding that “[w]hether to obtain an abortion is surely
a much more complex decision for a young person than whether to kill
an innocent person.”186
B. The Mandatory Life Imprisonment Cases
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court reiterated the
Roper categorical distinction between adolescents and adults in holding
unconstitutional mandatory life imprisonment sentences for offenders
committing non-homicide crimes when under eighteen-years-ofage.187
After finding a national consensus against the use of mandatory life
sentences for juveniles committing crimes other than homicide,188 the
Court addressed the question of juvenile culpability. Reaffirming the
Roper three-component recognition of adolescent/adult differences,189
the Court noted that “developments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds.”190
The Court again emphasized that juvenile offenders manifest a
unique “capacity for change,” which makes them “most . . . receptive
to rehabilitation.”191 A sentence of life without parole eliminates the
possibility of rehabilitation.192 Given the limited culpability of juveniles
and the severity of life-without-parole sentences, coupled with juvenile

184. Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (emphasis omitted).
185. See supra notes 135–147 and accompanying text.
186. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620.
187. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
188. Id. at 2023–27.
189. Id. at 2026–27. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
190. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
191. Id. at 2030.
192. Id.

33

GARDNER (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

2/13/2014 11:41 AM

[Vol. 28

offenders’ amenability to rehabilitation, the Court concluded that such
sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment.193
As in Roper, the Graham Court defended the “clear line” of age
eighteen as the basis for distinguishing juveniles and adults, repeating
Roper’s reliance on that age as “the point where society draws the
line.”194 In defense of its “categorical” rejection of mandatory sentences, the Court downplayed a case-by-case sentencing approach,
noting that even if we were to assume that some juvenile non-homicide
offenders might have “sufficient psychological maturity and at the
same time demonstrate sufficient depravity” to merit a life-withoutparole sentence, it does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case
proportionality approach could, with sufficient accuracy, distinguish
the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the
capacity for change.195
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the majority that “Roper’s conclusion that juveniles are typically less culpable
than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases,”196 but opposed a categorical rule outside the death penalty context.197 Treating life sentences as analogous to capital punishment was, for Roberts, “at odds
with [the] longstanding view that ‘the death penalty is different from
other punishments in kind rather than degree.’”198
Shortly after Graham, the Court in Miller v. Alabama199 again extended Eighth Amendment protection in finding it cruel and unusual
punishment to impose mandatory life sentences without parole for
those committing murder when under age eighteen at the time of their
crimes.200 The Court once more emphasized the Roper/Graham posi-

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2032 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572) (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2038–39, 2041–42.
198. Id. at 2038–39 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)). Justice Thomas,
in dissent, agreed. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046–49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
200. Id. at 2475.
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tion that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,”201 finding in fact that the science supporting
those differences had become “even stronger,”202 while observing that
the logic of Graham was not limited to non-homicide cases. “[N]one
of what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive . . . mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime specific.”203 The
Court concluded that sentencing a juvenile to mandatory life without
parole precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as “the possibility of rehabilitation.”204 As in Graham, Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Miller.
Identifying the principle behind the majority’s decision to be “that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently,”205 Roberts saw no logical way to avoid the eventual unconstitutionality of all criminal punishment of juveniles under that
principle.206
C. The Adolescent/Adult Distinction: Implications Beyond Punishment
Contexts
The punishment cases constitute an unambiguous expression of
protectionist rights. Moreover, the cases constitute the Court’s first
attempt to identify the dissimilarity between adults and juveniles
through the use of social science evidence.207 A leading commentator

201. Id. at 2464.
202. Id. at 2465, n.5.
203. Id. at 2465.
204. Id. at 2468.
205. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2482. One year prior to Miller, the Court referred to Roper and Graham in concluding that juveniles “are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures than adults.”
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (holding that age is a relevant factor to
be taken into account when deciding whether a suspect is in “custody” for purposes of deciding
whether or not Miranda warnings must be given).
207. Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision-making: Reduced Culpability in the Criminal Justice
System and Recognition of Complexity in Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375,
388 n.124 (2011) (“Roper was the first time the Supreme Court applied psychological studies to
the area of juvenile law”).
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has observed that “the Court has broken new ground in a scientific
venture to decipher the young minds of those who violate the law.”208
While the cases are clearly significant in criminal, and arguably juvenile, justice areas,209 it is unclear how wide-ranging their precedential
value will be.210
Three possibilities appear: (1) the protectionist concept expressed
in the punishment cases could be limited to responsibility assessments
of juveniles in punishment regimes; (2) the concept could extend beyond issues of juvenile responsibility to any determination of the rights
of juveniles; or (3) the concept could extend outside punishment contexts to some, but not all, identifications of juvenile rights and responsibilities. The following discussion suggests that if the Court continues
to be influenced by extant social science, the third possibility is the
most likely.
1. Punishment only
The three adolescent characteristics identified by the Court in the
punishment cases— (1) propensity to engage in reckless (risky) behavior, (2) susceptibility to peer pressure, and (3) transitory character development—all speak directly to culpability issues and amenability to
rehabilitation within the criminal and juvenile justice systems. The
first two characteristics suggest that the retributive and deterrent goals
of punishment are less applicable to minors than to adults,211 while the
third consideration supports the view that the interest of punitive systems in lengthy incapacitation of dangerous offenders is less applicable
to juveniles given their unique potential for rehabilitation.212 Apart
from the context of state regulation of sexual activity discussed later in
this paper, it is difficult to imagine other juvenile law settings where all

208. Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 379, 384 (2006).
209. See Justice Roberts’s observation, supra text accompanying note 206.
210. See Denno, supra note 208, at 396; Schad, supra note 207, at 388 (“In the future, support for neuroscience and psychology will most likely continue to influence the Court’s reasoning
regarding juvenile punishment, and may also begin to affect other areas of juvenile law.”).
211. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2028–29 (2010); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65.
212. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 191–193, and 204.
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three of the characteristics the Court found so relevant to punishment
issues would be equally apposite.213
Yet, the import of the punishment cases seems to extend beyond
punishment contexts to any situation in which the three characteristics
(or any of them?) are relevant in deciding the given controversy. As
one commentator noted, “[t]o the extent that researchers can reliably
identify contexts in which adolescents are likely to make competent
decisions, and others in which they are less likely to do so, developmental science might usefully inform law or policy.”214 Another observed that the “possible applications of the ‘kids are just different’ argument [of the punishment cases] abound” in a variety of contexts
including such things as the ability to enter into contracts.215
2. Universal protectionism
At the other extreme, it could be argued that the Court has finally
settled on a thoroughgoing recognition of protectionist rights, based
on sound social science and applicable to all contexts of juvenile law,
thus answering the call for a systematic and “coherent, consistent policy with respect to children’s rights.”216 To the extent that the punishment cases recognize immutable characteristics of adolescence, the
cases suggest that once and for all the Court has embraced the view
that “juveniles, as a class, have unique needs for protection and guidance that are greater than and different from the needs of adults.”217
213. Professor Emily Buss has cautioned that the research utilized in the punishment cases
“may be most useful, and least dangerous, whereas in the context of juvenile antisocial behavior,
it confirms conventional wisdom and therefore supports policies safely within the mainstream.”
Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection between Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 493, 494 (2009). See infra notes 258–365 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
constitutionality of fornication statues applied to minors.
214. Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1099.
215. Eliza Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy after Roper v. Simmons: “Kids Are Just Different” and “Kids Are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273,
274 (2008).
216. See supra text accompanying note 2.
217. Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment through the Lens of Childhood Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 292, 297
(2012) (commenting that the scientific research utilized in the punishment cases “fully back[s]”
the view that “kids are different”).
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Such a finding would appear to preclude recognition of personhood
rights for juveniles.
Interpreting the social science conclusions buttressing the punishment cases as committing the Court exclusively to an immutable protectionist concept of juvenile rights may be mistaken, however, for several reasons. In the first place, no scientific data ever settles anything
indefinitely. As Emily Buss points out, even the most careful reliance
on the best developmental research is subject to change over time.218
Overreliance on scientific evidence runs the risk that the law “will lock
in a development status quo” that might eventually turn out to be misguided.219 Moreover, Professor Buss notes that “context clearly plays a
role in minors’ development, and expectations and experiences can accelerate or slow down minors’ progress toward maturity.”220 Therefore
“there is nothing inherent about an adolescent’s blameworthiness
however well we understand the progress of their development, and it
is up to the law, not developmental science, to assign that blame,” in
light of not just scientific, but also legal and moral, considerations.221
Additional considerations argue against unlimited extension of the
rationale of the punishment cases. While the cases provide scientific
support for traditional protectionist principles holding that adolescents are different from adults, as mentioned above, other research—
reflected in the Supreme Court’s abortion case law— indicates no differences, at least in contexts such as medical treatment decision making.222 Thus, in the words of one commentator, “the state can, does,
and should distinguish between the competence necessary to have an
abortion—and the relative moral blameworthiness and capacity for
change that justifies differential treatment when accused of a crime.”223

218. Buss, supra note 213, at 508.
219. Id. at 508–09.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 510. Professor Vivian Hamilton adds: “Policy making . . . often requires definite,
clearly bounded categories. Developmental science may usefully inform but cannot determine
these.” Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1117.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57, 126–137.
223. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 159 (2009).
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However, this seeming conflict between the protectionism of the
punishment cases and the personhood underpinnings of the abortion
context can be explained, if not reconciled, by viewing the abortion
decisions as sui generis.224 Thus, juveniles would possess protectionist
rights in all situations except abortion decision making.
Whatever the legal and policy merits of such a view, leading social
scientists argue that sound empirical data provides the basis for a
broader recognition of personhood rights while, at the same time, embracing the science underlying the protectionism of the punishment
cases. They argue that no contradiction is involved in holding that adolescents function like adults in some contexts and differently in others:
[W]e believe that the . . . seemingly contradictory positions in [abortion decision making] and [culpability for criminal offenses] are in
fact quite compatible with research on age differences in cognitive
and psychosocial capacities. More specifically, our findings, as well as
those of other researchers, suggest that whereas adolescents and
adults perform comparably on cognitive tests measuring the sorts of
cognitive abilities [entailed in abortion decisions], abilities that permit logical reasoning about moral, social and interpersonal matters—
adolescents and adults are not of equal maturity with respect to the
psychosocial capacities listed by [the Court] in Roper—capacities such
as impulse control and resistance to peer influence. Not only were
the legal issues different in the . . . cases, but so are the circumstances
surrounding abortion decisions and criminal behavior, and therefore,
the relevant dimensions along which adolescents and adults should
be compared differ as well. Unlike adolescents’ decisions to commit
crimes, which are usually rash and made in the presence of peers,

224. See the Court’s comments in Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979), supra notes 141–
144 and accompanying text. Professor Elizabeth Scott argues that “many . . . features distinguish
abortion from routine medical decisions, and give rise to arguments that pregnant teens should
be deemed adults in this context.” Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 569–70 (2000). In addition to noting the concerns expressed in Bellotti,
Professor Scott suggests a protectionist element involved in permitting minors to make abortion
decisions: “[G]iven the health risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and the consequences for the
girl’s future welfare, the paternalistic argument for making abortion available to minors is a powerful one.” Id. at 570.
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adolescents’ decisions about terminating a pregnancy can be made in
an unhurried fashion and in consultation with adults.225

On this view, the boundary between adolescence and adulthood
should be drawn differently for some purposes than for others.226 For
decision-making contexts that allow for unhurried logical reflection,
adolescents might generally and justifiably be treated as adults.227 At
the same time, in situations involving emotional arousal, pressure from
peers, or risky and impulsive behavior, the protectionism embodied in
the punishment cases should prevail.228

225. Laurence Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 586. Professor Vivian Hamilton adds:
[T]he ability to reason reaches mature levels by mid-adolescence, around age sixteen. . . . The heightened vulnerability to risk taking that peaks in middle adolescence
before declining is normative; to the extent that it has a neurobiological basis, efforts
to reduce risk taking through education will have limited success. While adolescents
have the cognitive capacities to make rational decisions, real-world contexts and stressors will continue to confound their capacities and impede their decision-making. So
far, only aging (and, presumably, the neural development that attends it) reliably and
significantly correlates with decreases in adolescent risk taking. As a result of this ongoing development, adolescents’ decision-making abilities will be both age dependent
and context specific.
Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1118. See also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging
a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006) (distinguishing between adolescent competence in
“formal” and “informal” settings).
226. Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 592.
227. Id. See also Schad, supra note 207, at 399 (arguing that adolescents in “structured circumstances,” such as those involved in end of life decisions, should be free to give their own
informed consent).
228. Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 592; Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1109–10 (adolescents engage in higher rates of risky behavior than do adults when in “emotionally charged” or
“pressured situations” despite being as knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate when
thinking about risky activity as their elders). It may often be difficult to determine whether a
given case constitutes one of “unhurried logical reflection,” where adolescents could enjoy personhood rights, or one of “emotional arousal” influenced by peer pressure, where protectionism
prevails. Consider, for example, a situation where a juvenile asserts a right to be emancipated
from her parents over their objection. While “unhurried logical reflection” may be present,
emancipating oneself from one’s parents may be deemed a heady matter for many teenagers, thus
generating peer influence to seek emancipation. For a case where an eighteen-year-old filed for
emancipation over the objection of her parents, see Ort v. Ort, 42 A.3d 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2012). See also, In re Snyder, 532 P.2d 278 (Wash. 1975) (sixteen-year-old petitioned court
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3. Contextual protectionism
Assuming the validity of the social science described above,229 it is
fair to say that the scientific rationale of the punishment cases extends
beyond culpability issues within the criminal or juvenile justice contexts, while not necessarily mandating protectionism throughout the
whole of juvenile law.230 While it is not readily apparent how extensive
the precedential value of the punishment cases will be, they seem
clearly relevant in cases assessing constitutional rights of juveniles in
contexts involving risky conduct.231 The punishment cases are arguably
also applicable in situations involving decisions and actions by juveniles
that are not risky in nature, but that might nevertheless be influenced
by desires to gain peer approval or to avoid peer rejection.232
To illustrate their potential impact on issues other than juvenile
culpability, the next section relates the punishment cases to a hypothetical situation of a juvenile asserting a claim of a constitutional right
to engage in acts of sexual intimacy, in violation of state statute and
against the wishes of her parents. Although the case is hypothetical, it
is derived from fact situations of actual lower court cases.

V.

The Punishment Cases and State Prohibitions of
Fornication between Juveniles

The Supreme Court has rarely addressed constitutional controversies where the interests of parents and the State align against a juvenile.

to declare her an “incorrigible child,” over objection of her parents, in order to be removed from
her parents’ custody).
229. See supra text and notes 222–225.
230. The Court has already referenced the punishment cases in a situation not dealing with
culpability issues. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). It remains to be seen
whether the Court will eventually recognize the studies equating adolescent and adult cognitive
capabilities. See supra, notes 222–225 and accompanying text. Such recognition may suggest a
wider recognition of personhood rights and a rethinking of some prior cases. See, e.g., discussion
of the Parham case, supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
231. Peer influence affects adolescent judgment through “direct” peer pressure, as when
they are induced to take risks they might otherwise avoid, and also “indirectly” through the desire
for peer approval, and consequent fear of rejection, even without direct coercion. ELIZABETH S.
SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 38–39 (2008).
232. Id. See, e.g., the emancipation example, supra note 228.
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However, a possible candidate that could reach the Court in the near
future concerns the unsettled question of whether fornication statutes
can constitutionally be applied to adolescents who engage in private
consensual sexual activities with other adolescent partners. This section will analyze that issue, taking into account the impact of the
Court’s recent punishment cases. The discussion will show that application of those cases leads to a decisive finding of constitutionality,
which would be uncertain without their precedent.
A. Kathy’s Case: Framing the Issue
Suppose a mother and father have a fifteen-year-old daughter,
Kathy. The mother hears a noise in Kathy’s bedroom at 3:00 in the
morning on a school day. The mother opens the bedroom door, enters
the room to check on Kathy, and immediately notices that a bedroom
window is open wide enough for a person to enter. Upon turning on
the bedroom light, the mother discovers Kathy engaged in sexual intercourse with a young man, Mike, also fifteen-years-old, whom Kathy
had secretly invited into her room. The mother, who has taught Kathy
the virtues of sexual abstinence prior to marriage, is shocked, surprised,
and upset by her discovery.233
Having experienced a long history of rebellion by Kathy against a
variety of family rules, Kathy’s parents decide to elicit state assistance
in governing their child. They request that Kathy be adjudicated a
child in need of supervision.234 While juvenile authorities evaluate the
request, Kathy and Mike both confess to engaging in sexual intercourse. After receiving this evidence, the authorities elect to charge

233. The facts in the text correspond roughly to those of In re J.M., 575 S.E. 2d 441 (Ga.
2003), discussed in detail, infra note 263 and accompanying text.
234. Parents often seek state assistance in managing their disobedient children by requesting status offenses adjudications. See, e.g., In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985)
(mother seeking PINS adjudication of her fifteen-year-old daughter for association with an older
lesbian). See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process
Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153, 172–73 (1978) (discussing status offense jurisdiction as “the classic resort to public force in support of parental authority”).
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both Kathy and Mike with an act of delinquency for violating the state
fornication statute.235 Kathy’s parents support the delinquency action,

235. Fornication, in the context of penal law, is the crime of voluntary sexual intercourse
between unmarried parties. A HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 279 (Bryan A. Garner, ed.
(2000)). While now constitutionally suspect, see infra notes 239–258 and accompanying text, fornication prohibitions still exist in roughly a quarter of the states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02
(West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6603 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §18
(West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.335 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN §609.34
(West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-29-1 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-184 (West
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1120 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §16-15-60 (2012); UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-7-104 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-344 (West 2012) (held unconstitutional when applied to adults, see infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text).
It should be noted that Kathy’s arguably immoral and possibly unhealthy sexual conduct could
also have triggered a status offense petition under commonly-enacted language imposing juvenile
court jurisdiction for such things as a juvenile behaving in a manner “injurious to [her] health or
morals.” See, e.g., NEB. REV. STATS. § 43-247(3) (Reissue 1998) (extending juvenile court jurisdiction to juveniles who “deport [themselves] so as to injure or endanger seriously [their morals
or health]”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Anderson Supp. 1995) (same) E.S.G. v. State,
447 S.W. 2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (upholding the quoted language against a void-for-vagueness attack). See also, infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text for a discussion of the status
offense/delinquency distinction. In my hypothetical, I chose to have Kathy’s case brought as a
delinquency matter in order to raise the issue of the constitutionality of fornication statutes as
applied to minors.
In addition to being governed by a fornication statute or as a juvenile status offense measure, in
some jurisdictions the sexual conduct of both Kathy and Mike could theoretically be punished
under gender-neutral statutory rape laws. For example, an Arizona statute provides: “A person
commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse . . . with any person who is under eighteen years of age.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131405 (2012). The Supreme Court has suggested that such provisions “permit prosecution of both
minor females and minor males [presumably for the same act of sexual intercourse] for engaging
in mutual consensual conduct.” Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 493 (1981) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a California statutory rape statute punishing only males).
Similarly a Utah statute defines “rape of a child” as follows: “A person commits rape of a child
when the person has sexual intercourse with a child who is under the age of 14.” UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-402.1(1) (2003). Thus where a thirteen-year-old girl had “consensual” sexual relations with a 12-year-old boy, under “the literal language of the statute . . . both [parties] could
[be] adjudicated delinquent for rape of a child.” State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1208 n.2 (Utah
2007). Although the Utah Supreme Court declared that such an interpretation of the statute
constituted an “absurd” result and was therefore not permitted, id. at 1211, the court proclaimed
that the conduct of both parties could be punished under the state fornication statute. Id. at 1212.
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believing that it may have beneficial consequences for their daughter.236
At the adjudication proceeding, Kathy admits violating the fornication statute, but argues that the statute unconstitutionally denies her
right to engage in acts of sexual intimacy. The prosecution argues that
the statute constitutionally protects legitimate state interests aimed at
protecting the welfare of minors as well as providing a basis for enforcing parental interests in inculcating the values of sexual abstinence in
the lives of their children.237
The following discussion will show that Kathy’s claim is strengthened considerably by the widely held view that adults now possess a
constitutional right to engage in consensual sexual intimacies in private.238 I will assess whether such a right extends to Kathy, first without
taking the Supreme Court’s juvenile punishment cases into account.
That analysis provides Kathy a strong argument that is subsequently
discredited by my consideration of the impact of the punishment cases
demonstrating the constitutionality of the fornication statute.

236. In most jurisdictions, delinquency adjudications are aimed at providing rehabilitative
assistance to youthful violators of criminal statutes. See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 7–10 (2012). While the rehabilitative effectiveness of juvenile court dispositions has come
under severe criticism, see generally, id., the Supreme Court has expressed a modicum of optimism
that the juvenile court movement may eventually live up to its promise of benefitting those adjudicated delinquent. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (holding that jury trials
are not constitutionally required in delinquency adjudications). The most common disposition
for adjudicated delinquents is probation, with court-imposed conditions. DAVIS, supra note 2, at
394–97. Commitment to an institution is possible but “is increasingly viewed as a last resort.” Id.
at 394.
237. A similar situation existed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968),
where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an obscenity statute directed only to minors as a constitutionally permissible vehicle for aiding both state and parental responsibilities to promote the
well-being of juveniles.
238. See infra notes 239–248 and accompanying text.
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B. Constitutionality of Fornication Statutes Applied to Adults

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the matter, it is
widely assumed that fornication statutes are unconstitutional when applied to adults239 in light of a series of cases culminating in the Court’s
2003 decision, Lawrence v. Texas.240 Without attempting a full account
of these cases, I provide a brief summary of several which will suffice
for present purposes.
In Griswold v. Connecticut241 the Supreme Court recognized that
sexual intimacies of married couples are protected by a right to privacy
beyond the scope of government regulation.242 The right was given expansive articulation in the famous dictum of Eisentadt v. Baird: “If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”243 Aspects of this right were extended
to juveniles in the Carey, Planned Parenthood, and Bellotti cases discussed
earlier.244

239. Marghretta Adeline Haged, South Carolina’s Sexual Conduct Laws After Lawrence v.
Texas, 61 S.C. L. REV. 799 (2010) (“State laws proscribing consensual sexual conduct between
adults are unconstitutional. . . .”); Juhi Mehta, Prosecuting Teenage Parents Under Fornication Statutes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Social Problem of Teen Pregnancy, 5 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S T.J. 121, 142 (1998) (“[T]he . . . right to engage in sexual intercourse [is constitutionally] implicit.”); Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage
Amendments As Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 272 (2005) (“[F]ornication [is [n]ow] constitutionally protected conduct.”).
240. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Even before Lawrence, some courts had struck
down fornication statutes. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977)
(holding fornication statute violated “fundamental right to privacy”).
241. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law forbidding the use
of contraceptives unconstitutionally denied the right of marital privacy).
242. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), supra note 136 and accompanying text.
243. Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts statute criminalizing the dispensing of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated equal protection). Because Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds, the statement quoted in the text expressing a substantive right to privacy is technically dicta.
244. See supra notes 120–151 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in Lawrence, a case described by Laurence Tribe as “laying
down a landmark that opens vistas rather than enclosing them,”245 the
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy as
violating constitutionally protected liberty applicable to “certain intimate conduct.”246 The Court held that the state’s asserted interest in
maintaining traditional moral standards constituted an insufficient basis to support the statute.247 Indeed, in concluding that the “Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest” the Court apparently held that
no possible justification could outweigh the privacy intrusion inherent
in the statute.248
While addressing homosexual sodomy, Lawrence is widely understood as recognizing a broader reach that encompasses “a right for all
people, both gay and straight, to engage in private intimate conduct
free from government intrusion”249 Lawrence’s holding thus solidifies

245. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). I have examined Lawrence in detail elsewhere.
Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 19 (2004). Thus, I will not repeat that discussion here.
246. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). The statute infringed on “a right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 578.
247. The Lawrence Court saw the central issue in the case as whether the “majority may
use the power of the state to enforce [moral] views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law.” Id. at 571. The Court found that moral aversion to homosexual sodomy failed to
constitute a “legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.” Id. at 578.
248. Id. Thus, in the view of a court interpreting Lawrence, even an asserted interest in
protecting public health would have been insufficient to sustain the Texas statute. See Martin v.
Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005), discussed in detail, infra at note 251 and accompanying
text.
Some read Lawrence as applying minimal, “rational basis,” scrutiny, see, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 586 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Lawrence applies an “unheard-of form of rational basis review”). See
infra notes 329–330 and accompanying text. Others find that the Court did not articulate a standard of review. See, e.g., Daniel Allender, Applying Lawrence: Teenagers and the Crime Against Nature, 58 DUKE L. J. 1825, 1836 (2004) (the question of the standard of review “remains unresolved”); Tribe, supra note 245, at 1916, 1943 (the Lawrence Court did not articulate a standard
of review).
249. Allender, supra note 248, at 1839. “[T]he complete rationale for the decision supports
a right of all unmarried adults to engage in whatever private, consensual sexual activity they will—
free of criminal sanction.” Ricks, supra note 239, at 279; “Lawrence . . . suggests a right . . . to an
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the Eisenstadt dictum and extends constitutional privacy protection beyond decisions regarding procreative choices to any context involving
private consensual intimate conduct. While broad in scope, the Lawrence Court did attempt to place some limitation on the reach of the
case, declaring that, among other things, “the present case does not
involve minors.”250 Such language, while clearly dicta, is also ambiguous. It is not clear whether it addresses cases where minors engage in
consensual sexual intimacies with adults, or with other minors, or with
both.
Regarding its impact on fornication statutes, at least one court has
concluded that Lawrence renders such statutes unconstitutional when
applied to adults. In Martin v. Ziherl,251 the Virginia Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the state fornication statute and
found “no relevant distinction” between the sexual activity at issue in
Lawrence and that prohibited by the Virginia statute.252 Finding heterosexual intercourse to constitute “an element of a personal relationship . . . within the liberty interest of persons to choose,”253 the court
concluded that subjecting that private conduct of two consenting
adults to criminal penalties constituted a violation of liberty protected
under the Due Process Clause.254 The Martin court read Lawrence255 as
ruling out any attempt to justify the fornication statute in terms of such
traditional state interests as protecting public health and assuring that
children are not born out of wedlock.256 For the Martin court, these
interests “are insufficient to sustain the statute’s constitutionality.”257
Finally, the Martin court allowed that the fornication statute might be

intimate sexual relationship distinct from marriage.” Tribe, supra note 245, at 1937.
250. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
251. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367 (Va. 2005).
252. Id. at 370.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 370–71. The Utah Court of Appeals intimated that the State’s fornication statute
may also be unconstitutional under Lawrence. Berg v. Utah, 100 P.3d 261, 263, n.3 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004). The Court did not address the merits of the constitutional claim because the person
attacking the statute lacked standing to assert his claim.
255. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
256. Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 370.
257. Id.
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constitutional when applied to juveniles, stressing that it is “important
to note that this case does not involve minors” while observing that
Lawrence leaves open the possibility of minors and adults possessing
different privacy rights.258
C. Constitutionality of Fornication Statutes Applied to Juveniles
Assuming that fornication statutes are now unconstitutional when
applied to adults, Kathy will claim that she is entitled to the same protection. As I will show, recognition of her claim may well depend on
whether or not the protectionist principles of the punishment cases
extend to her situation.
1. Kathy’s claim without appeal to the punishment cases
Apparently no cases yet address the impact of Lawrence on the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. Even before
Lawrence, however, some courts recognized that minors enjoy a state
constitutional right to engage in sexual intimacies. For example, in B.B.
v. Florida,259 a sixteen-year-old was charged in juvenile court with “unlawful carnal intercourse” with a consenting partner, also sixteen years
old. The statute prohibited such conduct with anyone of previous
“chaste character” under eighteen years old.260 The court found that
enforcing the statute denied the minor’s state constitutional right to
privacy, violation of which could not be justified in terms of state interests in protecting the “health and quality of life” of those involved
in “minor-minor” sexual activity.261 Noting that a minor’s privacy right
could not be used to penetrate the “shield” of statutes protecting minors from sexual exploitation by adults,262 the court declared that enforcement of the minor-minor statute could not be used as a “weapon
to adjudicate a minor delinquent,” even in light of “the real-life crisis
of children having children,” the “plague of AIDS,” and “the rampant

258. Id. at 371.
259. B.B. v. Florida, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
260. Id. at 257.
261. Id. at 258–59.
262. Id. at 259–60.
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spread of serious communicative disease which is the sad product of
sexual promiscuity.”263
While B.B. is binding only in Florida, it does suggest a basis for
recognition of a similar federal right to privacy for minors under existing case law, especially if Lawrence is applicable. Moreover, even without Lawrence, Kathy has a plausible argument that application of the
fornication statute violates her right to make “decisions whether to
bear or beget a child” under Carey.264
Whether Lawrence applies to minors is unclear. Although the Lawrence Court noted that the case did not “involve minors,” the statement
is clearly dicta and not binding on subsequent courts.265 Moreover,
even if minors are exempted from Lawrence’s scope, it might only be in
situations where young people risk being victimized by more powerful
sexual partners, rather than in situations like Kathy and Mike’s where
consensual sexual intimacies are shared by partners of roughly the
same age with neither posing a particular risk of exploiting the other.266

263. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court similarly found that a sixteen-year-old charged with
the crime of fornication enjoyed a state constitutional right to privacy that protected his private,
consensual, sexual intercourse with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend. In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga.
2003). The court concluded that because sixteen was the age of consent for state statutory rape
purposes, the minor was “sufficiently old to decide whether to engage in sexual intercourse” and
therefore fell within the protection of the state constitutional privacy right, which outweighed
the government’s asserted interest in “regulating the behavior of ‘minors.’” Id. at 444. The Georgia Supreme Court had previously held that the state privacy provision prevented the state from
criminalizing “private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons legally
able to consent,” thus exempting the parties in J.M. from criminal liability. Id. at 443.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 124–126.
265. At least one court has, however, interpreted Lawrence as inapplicable to statutes punishing minors for acts of sodomy. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E. 2d 920 (N.C. 2007), upholding the
delinquency adjudication of a fourteen-year-old who participated in acts of fellatio with his
twelve-year-old girlfriend in violation of the state “crimes against nature” statute. The court
found Lawrence inapplicable “by [its] very language,” quoting the dictum that “the present case
does not involve minors.” Id. at 925 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
266. Some people argue, however, that “consensual” sexual relations between teenagers
are inherently coercive, as girls often appear to “consent” while being influenced by a variety of
factors, including a desire for male attention, thus entering into “painfully one-sided” bargains.
Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 709, 714 (2000).
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Kathy will argue that the empirical data establishes that as an adolescent she is a functional adult,267 entitled to the protections of Lawrence268 that render fornication statutes unconstitutional.269 She will
also rely on the principle articulated in Carey that minors enjoy the
same privacy rights as adults unless “significant” state interests, unique
to minors, justify denial of the rights.270 Kathy will point out that the
health and risk of pregnancy issues found wanting by the Virginia court
in Martin271 are exactly the same interests at stake in assessing the constitutionality of fornication statutes when applied to juveniles, are not
unique to minors, and therefore cannot override her privacy rights.272
One aspect of Kathy’s case is uniquely different from the adult issues addressed in Martin, however. The statute not only protects state
interests, but assists her parents in their attempts to instill the values
of chastity in her life.273 Kathy will respond by pointing out that even
some pre-Lawrence courts have held that adolescents possess privacy
rights that are beyond the power of parents to affect through invoking

267. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text .
268. At least one serious commentator agrees. See Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory Rape in a
Post- Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 S.M.U.L. REV. 77, 81, 88 (2005) “([I]f [a] State had absolutely
precluded [a seventeen-year-old’s] sexual expression . . . it should be held unconstitutional”).
269. See supra notes 239–258 and accompanying text.
270. See supra text at note 123. “[I]f minors enjoy the same privacy rights as adults when
making procreation decisions, the protections of Lawrence should also be extended to minors.”
Claudio J. Pavia, Constitutional Protection of “Sexting” in the Wake of Lawrence: The Rights of Parents
and Privacy, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 189, 208–209 (2011). See also Mehta, supra note 239, at 142
(implicit in a minor’s right to decide matters involving childbearing is “the corresponding right
to engage in sexual intercourse”).
271. See supra notes 251–258 and accompanying text.
272. Some commentators agree. See supra note 261. See also, Pavia, supra note 270, at 198:
“Teens should be free from governmental control over private sexual activity when there is no
exploitation or direct harm.”
The claim in the text that there are no interests unique to juveniles assumes, of course, that the
factors differentiating adolescents and adults recognized in the Supreme Court’s punishment
cases are not taken into account. As will be shown in the next section, when those factors are
considered, Kathy’s claim is refuted.
273. See supra text at note 234. For a discussion of the possible futility and damage to parent-child relations when parents report their child’s sexual activities to law enforcement authorities, see Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage Sex? 89 KY. L.
J. 135, 192–95 (2000).
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the power of the state. She will refer, for example, to a New York case
holding that a mother’s attempt to have her fifteen-year-old daughter
adjudicated a person in need of supervision because of the daughter’s
refusal to stop associating with a twenty-one-year-old lesbian violated
the daughter’s “right of privacy to decide and pursue her own sexual
orientation.”274
In addition to legal arguments, Kathy will raise a variety of policy
considerations to support her claim. She will point out that her conduct with Mike would not be a crime in a substantial majority of
states.275 Where statutes do prohibit the conduct, they are virtually
never enforced,276 making their ability to deter the sexual activity virtually non-existent. On the other hand, if prosecutions for fornication
were regularly brought,277 the courts could be flooded given the high
incidence of teenage sexual activity,278 with widespread jury nullification arguably a possible result.279 Moreover, the threat of enforcement,
even if remote, could discourage offenders from seeking access to contraceptives or medical care for sexually transmitted diseases through

274. In re Lori, 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). The court did instruct the
minor not to have sexual relations with the older woman, conduct which would offend state law
prohibiting persons over the age of twenty-one from engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse with
a person less than seventeen years of age.” Id. at 942.
275. As of 2003, thirty-eight states had removed voluntary teenage sexual activity from the
criminal law. Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Activity between
Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 437 (2003).
276. Id.
277. The possibility of rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes is made difficult in
light of the fact that evidence is seldom obtainable given the private, consensual nature of the
conduct.
278. As of 2005, studies indicated that nearly thirty percent of teens between the ages of
thirteen and sixteen were sexually active. Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet, Rethinking
the Regulation of Adolescent Sexuality, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 295–96 (2011) (citing Ana
Maria Arumne, Nearly 3 in 10 Young Teens “Sexually Active,” MSNBC.COM (Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6839072). See infra text and notes 281–285.
279. Phillis, supra note 278, at 296. Studies show that a majority of the American public
has moved away from viewing voluntary sexual activity between teenagers as a crime. Phipps,
supra note 275. If so, juries would likely be reluctant to convict minors in fornication cases. But
see infra notes 310–320, 344–345 (fornication prosecutions will occur in juvenile court where
juries are seldom utilized) and accompanying text.
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fear of legal consequences.280 Finally, some argue that far from harmful, the conduct engaged in by Kathy and Mike is a healthy aspect of
normal maturation.281
2. Kathy’s claim and the punishment cases
Whatever the credibility of Kathy’s claim to a personhood right to
engage in private consensual intimate relations with Mike without government interference, the merits of her position virtually vanish when
assessed in light of the categorical rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court in the punishment cases. That the rule extends to cases outside
the context of punishing juveniles has been urged earlier.282
The punishment cases recognize that adolescents under age eighteen are categorically less competent decision makers than adults283 due

280. Phipps, supra note 275, at 438. One court expressed the concern this way: “To the
extent that any successful program to combat venereal disease must depend upon affected persons
coming forward for treatment, [fornication statutes] operate . . . as a deterrent to such voluntary
participation. The fear of being prosecuted for the ‘crime’ of fornication can only deter people
from seeking such necessary treatment.” State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1977). But see infra text and notes 347–348.
281. “[S]ixty-three percent of the American public believes that adolescent sexual exploration is a natural part of growing up”. Kuo, supra note 273, at 136. David Richards observes:
If adolescents’ sexual conduct is governed by principles of equal concern and respect,
there can be, I believe, no principled ethical objection to it. In contrast, the moralistic
condemnation of all forms of sexual activity among adolescents encourages fears and
misunderstandings of sexuality instead of facilitating sexual self-esteem and the sense
of ethical discriminations that should rule all human relations.
Richards, supra note 18, at 55. “[S]ubstantial numbers of doctors and other health professionals
believe that [voluntary sexual intercourse] is a healthy part of an older adolescent’s development
into adulthood.” Loewy, supra note 268, at 86.
282. See supra notes 229–231 and accompanying text.
283. Discussing the virtues of categorical age rules defining the point at which legal rights
and responsibilities are triggered, Professor Elizabeth Scott has noted that “there is little evidence
that . . . the interests of adolescents are harmed by a regime of binary classification.” Scott, supra
note 224, at 577. Any argument that the law should expand the traditional binary distinction of
child/adult reflected in the punishment cases by adding a third category of “adolescence,” with
case-by-case assessments of maturity, would not be worth the administrative costs. Id. See also
Buss, supra note 213, at 505 (bright line rules “are necessarily inexact, excluding young people
prepared to behave competently and including some not ready to do so, but [the] lines make
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to: (1) youthful propensities to engage in risky behavior; (2) unique
susceptibility of adolescents to peer pressure; and (3) transitory character development of juveniles manifesting itself in exceptional amenability to rehabilitation.284 These factors become relevant “in emotionally charged or pressured situations” where adolescents “tend to
make bad decisions” and “struggle to control impulses that lead to undesirable behavior.”285 In such situations, the protectionist principles
of the punishment cases should obtain. All three factors distinguishing
adolescents from adults are clearly relevant when assessing the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to minors.
a. Fornication as risk taking.

There is little question that unprotected sexual intercourse is risky
behavior286 and that adolescents engage in such conduct in disproportionately large numbers.287 Sensation-seeking is a higher priority for
adolescents than adults288 and is more prevalent during adolescence
than in any other developmental period.289 A common manifestation
of adolescent sensation seeking is sex without contraception,290 reflect-

things clear and simple, and keep the law out of the difficult and costly business of making individualized assessments of capacity.”).
A particular virtue of a categorical rule proscribing teenage sexual activity is that it provides a
bright line giving an under-age adolescent who desires to avoid sexual activity an “easy answer to
another adolescent who wants to engage in sexual activity.” Phipps, supra note 275, at 436.
284. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
285. Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1110.
286. See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. By age seventeen, approximately twothirds of all adolescents have engaged in consensual sexual activity. Allender, supra note 248, at
1828; Marghretta Adeline Hagood, Note, South Carolina’s Sexual Conduct Laws After Lawrence v.
Texas, 61 S.C.L. REV. 799, 814 (2010) (estimated 90% of men and 80% of women have premarital sex before age nineteen); Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1108 (adolescents more likely than
adults to have casual sex). Professor Kuo has characterized this situation as an “epidemic of teenage sex.” Kuo, supra note 273, at 161. See also Phipps, supra note 275, at 436 (describing high
incidence of teenage sexual activity).
288. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 1773.
289. Id.
290. Buss, supra note 213, at 495.
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ing the relatively high value adolescents place on the immediate rewards of risky behavior while heavily discounting its future costs.291
The risks entailed in teenage sexual activity are well known. The
United States has an alarmingly high rate of teenage pregnancy,292 the
most common outcome of which is single motherhood293 with all its
associated problems.294 Also of considerable concern is the incidence
of sexually transmitted disease (STD), described as an “epidemic” by
the United States Center for Disease Control.295 Young people are disproportionately represented, with half of the twenty million yearly infections affecting people ages fifteen to twenty-four.296 Of teenagers
having sex, one in four will contract an STD prior to adulthood297
while one in two sexually active young people will be infected with an
STD by the age of twenty-five.298 One of the long-term consequences
of this epidemic is a high rate of infertility each year because of untreated STDs.299 Finally, mental health is also jeopardized by teenage
sexual activity. In encouraging sexual abstinence for all school age chil-

291. Id.
292. Mehta, supra note 239, at 123.
293. Poncz, supra note 215, at 321. It is estimated that 40% of teenage pregnancies end in
abortion. Teen STD Rates Rise, Despite High Condom Use, http://townhall.com/news/religion/
2012/07/05/teen_std_rates_rise_despite_high_condom_use (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
294. “Studies [show] that women who become parents as teenagers are at greater risk of
social and economic disadvantage than those who delay childbearing until adulthood.” Mehta,
supra note 239, at 123. “They are . . . likely to have larger families, raise their children in poverty,
rely on welfare, and are less likely to complete high school, to be married, to have employment
prospects, and to earn high wages.” Id. See also Poncz, supra note 215, at 321–22.
on

295. “Severe Epidemic” of Sexually-Transmitted Diseases is Sweeping the Nation, Warns CDC
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articleValentine’s
Day,
MAILONLINE.COM,

2278457/CDC-warns-Valentines-Day-eve-severe-epidemic-sexually-transmitted-diseasessweeping-nation.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
296. Id.
297. STD Statistics, TEENHELP.COM, http://www.teenhelp.com/teen-sexuality/std-statistics.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
298. STD Facts: Shocking Statistics You May Not Know about STDs, HUFFINGTONPOST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/std-facts_n_1282151.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
299. Teen STD Rates Rise, supra note 293.
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dren, Congress has declared that “sexual activity outside of the context
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological effects.”300
Experts attribute the high rate of reckless sexual activity in part to
the characteristic tendency of adolescents to believe that they are immune from long-term consequences of their actions.301 Such attitudes
were, of course, a factor in the Supreme Court’s conclusion that adolescents are categorically different from adults for purposes of imposing punishment.302
b. Fornication and peer pressure.

That teenage sexual activity is influenced by peer pressure also
needs little discussion. One commentator summarized a study of the
issue by concluding that “the driving force behind teen sexual activity
is peer pressure,”303 both in the “direct” sense of being pressured into
sexual activity by a sexual partner304 and “indirectly” by imitating sexual
behavior thought to be normative of the teen peer group.305 One need
only recall the “pregnancy pact” entered into by at least eighteen girls
in a Massachusetts high school306 to understand the power of adolescent peer pressure to influence sexual activity.

300. 42 U.S.C. § 710(2)(B),(E)(2012). See also Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates,
10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 311, 317 (“[C]hildren succumbing to the pressure to have sex can
lead to significant psychological damage”).
301. Teen STD Rates Rise, supra note 293.
302. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
303. Kuo, supra note 273 at 188.
304. Cooper, supra note 300 at 317 n.41 (“[G]irls are pressured to be sexual regardless of
the quality of relationships”), quoting MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES
OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 207 (1995). See also Oberman, supra note 266; Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Laws, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 68–70 (1994).
305. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61 at 1773 (“[S]ocial status appears to be an
important factor to many adolescents” contributing to risky decision-making regarding sexual
activity); Kuo, supra note 273, at 188 (“[S]tudents who believed that most of their peers have had
sex were 2.5 times more likely . . . to report a high intention to initiate [sexual intercourse] in the
upcoming school year”) quoting B. Kinsman et al., Early Sexual Initiation: The Role of Peer Norms,
102 PEDIATRICS 1185 (Nov. 1998). The distinction between “direct” and “indirect” peer pressure is noted supra note 231.
306. Discussed at Phillis, supra note 278, at 272–75.
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As with the tendency to engage in risky behavior, the influence of
peer pressure on adolescent sexual behavior is of the very kind discussed in the Supreme Court’s punishment cases.307 Indeed, it is likely
that peer pressure is an even more powerful influence of sexual behavior between teenage sexual partners—where the conduct is often legal
and, for many, morally ambiguous—than it is in the context of criminal
activity considered in the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases.308
c. Fornication and transitory character development.

The protectionism manifested in the punishment cases is also in
part a consequence of the Court’s conclusion that juveniles are
uniquely amenable to rehabilitation due to their transitory character

307. See supra text and notes 164–168. Cauffman and Steinberg observe:
One might be tempted to conclude . . . that given their priorities, adolescent risktakers make perfectly reasonable decisions. But while such decisions may be cognitively reasonable, they do not necessarily reflect maturity of judgment.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical adolescent male who is deciding whether to engage in unprotected sex. If he does, there are possible negative consequences (e.g., a
sexually transmitted disease, his partner’s pregnancy) and possible positive consequences (e.g., physical pleasure, excitement, improved status among peers, future relationship with partner). From a purely cognitive point of view, if, in the adolescent’s
mind, the possible positive consequences outweigh the possible negative consequences, then he should say “yes.” But this is precisely where the difference between
decision-making competence and maturity of judgment is crucial. If the adolescent is
responsible, peer pressure will not be a major factor in his decision, by virtue of his
autonomy. If the adolescent has perspective, he will recognize that the relationship
does not hinge on this single decision. And if the adolescent is temperate, the importance of “living for the moment” will be minimized. Thus, maturity of judgment
reflects a particular disposition towards the weighting of possible outcomes in a decision-making scenario.
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 1773–74.
308. Because the criminal conduct involved in the punishment cases (serious felonies) is
proscribed by regularly enforced statutes, universally supported by the moral sentiments of society, fewer “peers” are likely to encourage colleagues to commit those crimes than to engage in
sexual conduct. Moreover, while committing serious felonies may be deemed normative in some
sub-cultures and thus subject to “indirect” peer pressure, see supra note 305 and accompanying
text, the widespread incidence of teenage sexual activity is much more likely to be imitated by
teens in general than is the commission of serious felonies.
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development.309 This amenability contributed to the conclusion that
criminal sentences for juveniles with no possibility of rehabilitation are
unconstitutional.
As with risk-taking and vulnerability to peer pressure, the rehabilitation factor is likewise directly relevant when assessing the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. As Kathy’s case
illustrates, enforcement of fornication statutes occur in juvenile
court,310 where the customary aim of the preceding is to rehabilitate
the offender.311 Indeed, if fornication statutes are unconstitutional for
adults,312 a violation of such statutes by a minor would not, strictly
speaking, constitute an act of “delinquency” but instead would technically manifest a “status offense,” and as such would almost certainly be
limited to juvenile court jurisdiction.313 In addition to prosecution under fornication statutes, the conduct proscribed therein may also be

309. See supra note 178.
310. See discussion of the B.B. case, supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text; In re
L.A.N., 623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding fornication statute as applied to juveniles
under sixteen-years-old). Prior to the Lawrence case, there may have been in some jurisdictions a
theoretical possibility of a juvenile fornication case being waived to criminal court. However,
virtually all waiver criteria consider, among other things, the “seriousness of the offense,” that
factor (along with prior history of the juvenile) weighed most heavily by judges making waiver
decisions. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 334. Given the ubiquity of the conduct governed by fornication
statutes and the acceptance of the conduct by much of the public, see supra note 281, it is hard to
imagine a juvenile court judge ever waiving a fornication case to criminal court.
After Lawrence, however, fornication statutes can be enforced only against juveniles, and then
most likely in juvenile court. See infra notes 256–258 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the likely unconstitutionality of fornication statutes when applied to adults). If such
statutes are unconstitutional, there could be no adult punishment for such conduct, thus eliminating adult criminal court jurisdiction.
311. See, e.g., In re N.A., 539 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding adjudication
of a twelve-year-old girl for committing “the delinquent act of fornication” who was therefore
“in need of treatment and rehabilitation”). See also infra notes 316–322.
312. See supra notes 239, 251–257 and accompanying text.
313. “Delinquency” matters are those juvenile court proceedings where the conduct of the
offender would be a crime if committed by an adult. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 359. “Status offenses”
involve state intervention in situations unlawful only for minors. Id. at 93.
“The juvenile court . . . has jurisdiction over so called “status offenses.” Id. at 258. At the beginning of the twentieth century, progressive reformers created juvenile courts to exercise jurisdiction over noncriminal misconduct by youth. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
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seen as violating status offense provisions. As mentioned above, prosecutors may choose to treat sexual activity by minors as a threat to their
“health or morals”314 or under other such language characteristic of
many status offense statutes.315 Adjudication as either a status offender
or a delinquent usually results in structured probation aimed at rehabilitating the juvenile.316 While institutional confinement is a theoretical possibility,317 it is increasingly viewed as a last resort,318 and in some
jurisdictions cannot be imposed unless the court is convinced that all
less drastic dispositional alternatives have been exhausted.319 Even if a
court imposes an institutionalized commitment, its purpose is almost
always rehabilitative, at least in part.320
The Supreme Court’s recognition in the punishment cases that juveniles are categorically different from adults, due in part to their
unique amenability to rehabilitation, is the very premise of the juvenile
court movement.321 If it is unconstitutional to deny juveniles rehabilitation through the imposition of death and mandatory life imprisonment, it is difficult to see how it could be unconstitutional to afford

Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991); Leta R. Holden, Juvenile Law, 73 DENV. L. REV. 843, 845
(1996) (juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over status offenses). Committing a status offense “may subject the child to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 307 (Rev. 2d ed. 2005). The same is true of delinquency jurisdiction.
“Generally . . . legislatures have conferred upon the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over
children alleged to be delinquent.” SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 53 (2d. ed. 2013).
314. See supra note 235. See also E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W. 2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969),
for an example of likely sexual activity being addressed through status offense language proscribing conduct “injurious to [the defendant’s] health or morals.”
315. For a case illustrating how conduct can be conceptualized either as a delinquency situation or a status offense matter, see In re Spalding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975) (drug and sexual
activity of minor with adults initially considered acts of delinquency but ultimately treated as a
status offense matter).
316. See supra note 236. Probation conditions could include, among other things, educating the offender regarding the risks of sexual activity and the values of sexual abstinence.
317. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 388.
318. Id. at 394.
319. Id.
320. See Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 103, at 6–25, discussing the emergence of punishment as an additional goal to rehabilitation in some delinquency dispositions.
321. See Id. at 6–12.
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them the possible rehabilitative protections of the juvenile court when
they engage in risky sexual conduct.322
d. Summary.

It is clear that the same factors that distinguish adolescents from
adults in administering punishment also distinguish them from adults
when determining the constitutionality of governmental regulation of
sexual conduct. This similarity could mean that the adolescent/adult
distinction—which precludes juveniles from being held to adult responsibility for the punitive consequences of certain crimes—is itself
sufficient to deny adult rights to engage in consensual, private acts of
sexual intimacy. Juveniles would thus be denied personhood rights in
both the punishment and fornication contexts,323 and instead granted
the protectionism characteristic of the Court’s historical view of juvenile rights.324 Yet, there might still remain a question about whether
the adolescent/adult distinction in and of itself provides an adequate
basis for dismissing entirely the possible impact of the Lawrence case. I
therefore turn to the specific question of whether the privacy rights of
Lawrence extend to juveniles.

322. For many, the “rehabilitative protections of the juvenile court” are illusory. See, e.g.,
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083 (1991); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68
(1997). I take no position in this Article as to the effectiveness of the juvenile court system in
rehabilitating adjudicated offenders.
For a case upholding a fornication statute attacked by a juvenile as violating state constitutional
privacy protections, see In re L.A.N. 623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
323. For the view that punishment is an aspect of a basic right to treated as a “person” see
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 572 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman
Gross eds. 1975); Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989); Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be
Punished—A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838 (1981).
324. See supra notes 116–124 and accompanying text.
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3. Kathy’s claim and Lawrence
As noted above, the Lawrence Court declared in ambiguous dicta
that “the present case does not involve minors.”325 While some have
interpreted this statement to mean that the privacy protections spelled
out in the case are simply inapplicable to minors in any possible context,326 others read the case as not only relevant to constitutional privacy claims by minors but in fact extending to them the rights identified in the case.327 Assuming for the sake of argument, that Lawrence
might be applicable to Kathy’s case, it then becomes necessary to determine whether the punishment cases provide a basis for distinguishing Lawrence when assessing the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to minors.
The Lawrence Court invalidated the Texas sodomy statute because
no legitimate state interest supported the statute.328 Thus, the statute
was unconstitutional under even minimal, “rational basis,” review.329
Assuming that Kathy’s attack of the fornication statute under Lawrence
would also be subject to rational basis review,330 the statute would be

325. See, e.g., supra note 242 and accompanying text. “Lawrence’s application to consensual
teen sexual activity is not . . . certain.” Pavia, supra note 270 at 201.
326. See, e.g. supra note 265 discussing the R.L.C. case. Some commentators agree. See, e.g.,
Ricks, supra note 239 (Lawrence “covers only the conduct of adults”).
327. See, e.g., supra note 260.
328. See supra notes 247–248 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. The Cornell University Law School Legal
Information Institute defines “rational basis review” as follows:
The level of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of a federal or state
statute that does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect classification
under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
When a court concludes that there is no fundamental liberty interest or suspect classification at stake, the law is presumed to be Constitutional unless it fails the rational
basis test. Under the rational basis test, the courts will uphold a law if it is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of
the statute has the burden of proving that there is no conceivable legitimate purpose
or that the law is not rationally related to it.
Rational Basis Test, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test
(last updated Aug. 19, 2010).
330. The Martin court, see supra notes 251–252 and accompanying text, applied the “reasoning of Lawrence” in finding no legitimate state interest to support the fornication statute struck
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constitutional unless Kathy could show that the statute did not “reasonably” promote some “legitimate” state interest.331
The adolescent/adult distinction established by the Court in the
punishment cases means that legitimate governmental interests may
well be different for juveniles than for adults. Indeed, while interests
in preventing out of wedlock pregnancy and STDs may not constitute
legitimate state interests when fornication statutes are applied to
adults,332 those interests become legitimate when the same statutes are
enforced against minors, given teenage propensities for rampant unprotected sex encouraged by widespread peer influence. Sexual activity
by minors thus poses a special danger, unique to them, to which the
state may legally respond.333 The question then becomes whether fornication statues reasonably promote these legitimate state interests.
Kathy’s points about the minimal enforceability of fornication statutes

down under rational basis scrutiny. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367, 370–71 (Va. 2005). See also
Justice Scalia’s view, supra note 248 (the Lawrence Court applied an “unheard of” form of rational
basis review).
331. See supra note 329.
332. See Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 370 (finding that Lawrence finds any and “all manner of
states’ interests . . . insufficient” to justify intrusions upon a person’s “private, consensual sexual
conduct”).
333. The state has historically invoked its parens patriae power to intervene in the lives of
minors in efforts to protect their welfare. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 95,n. 14. Indeed, the parens
patriae concept constituted the historical justification for the juvenile court movement, which saw
young people as lacking adult culpability while being uniquely capable of being rehabilitated.
DAVIS, supra note 313, at 1–3. As to the “legitimacy” of regulating sexual activity of minors, a
Wisconsin court made these comments in an unpublished post-Lawrence opinion: “This state has
a long tradition of honoring its obligation to protect its children from themselves. Among the
many significant interests of the state are the dangers of pregnancy, venereal disease, damage to
reproductive organs, the lack of considered consent, heightened vulnerability to physical and
psychological harm, and the lack of mature judgment.” State v. Pryes, 320 Wis.2d 705, 2009 WL
1606746, 2 (Wis.Ct. App.) (emphasis added).
The recognition of “significant” interests in regulating teenage sexual activity should satisfy even
the Carey plurality’s caution that only a “significant state interest,” unique to minors, would justify
state denials of the “privacy rights of minors.” Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
693 (1977). It must be remembered that only a plurality of the Court in Carey recognized a privacy right applicable to juveniles. Id. Moreover, the Court assumed that the “Constitution does
not bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors,” id. at 694, n. 17, thus calling into
question the applicability of the Lawrence privacy right to juveniles.
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and their potential to discourage acquiring contraceptives and medical
care for STDs334 pose questions about the rationality of such statutes.
It must be remembered, however, that under rational basis scrutiny the
statute need not be “narrowly tailored” to meet the state’s interest nor
be the “least restrictive alternative available.”335 The statute need only
“arguably” protect those interests in a manner that is not totally arbitrary.336
It is unlikely that fornication statutes will ever be rigorously enforced. Obtaining evidence sufficient for conviction is notoriously difficult337 and even when available, prosecutors often decline to bring
charges.338 As a consequence, the deterrent effect of the statutes is min-

334. See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text.
335. Such factors are requirements under the “strict scrutiny” standard. See NOLO’S FREE
DICTIONARY OF LAW TERMS AND LEGAL DEFINITIONS STRICT SCRUTINY, available at
http://www.nolo.com/dictionarystrict_scrutiny_term.html.
336. The Supreme Court put the matter this way:
On rational-basis review, a . . . statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption
of validity . . . and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have
the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” . . . Moreover,
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it
is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. . . . In other words a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
FCC v. Bearch Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (citations omitted). The Court has
specifically recognized that so long as “plausible rationales” that merely “arguably” promote governmental interests exist, they are “sufficient on rational-basis review to immunize the [statute]
from constitutional challenge.” Id. at 320. Not surprisingly, commentators have concluded that
under such a relaxed standard “virtually any [statute] can survive rational basis review.” Robert
C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV.
281, 294 (2011) (noting that in rare instances, the Court has employed a more demanding rational
basis standard).
337. See, e.g., Phipps, supra note 275 at 438; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, note on adultery and fornication, at 435 (1980) (“Discovery and proof of [fornication] by means other than
self-admission is virtually impossible and is likely to involve surveillance techniques that are unseemly, if not unconstitutional.”).
338. Prosecutors presently make “difficult decisions” about culpability when deciding
whether to bring charges against minors engaging in sexual activity. Phipps, supra note 275, at
436.

62

GARDNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

2/13/2014 11:41 AM

The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and Adults

imized, but so also is the risk of dissuading minors from accessing contraceptives and medical care.
More rigorous enforcement of fornication laws is possible. For example, evidence of the crime is readily available when pregnancy occurs.339 If both prospective parents are charged, equal protection problems are minimized.340 Widespread enforcement would arguably
increase the deterrent effect of the statutes.341 Perhaps more significantly, rigorous enforcement would send a clear message to young
people that sexual activity is not condoned by society, perhaps providing an objective basis for those attempting abstinence to resist peer
pressure to engage in the conduct.342
Rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes against juveniles
would entail some costs. Flooding the courts with litigation may indeed result343 but the perceived problem of wholesale jury nullification344 is a red herring given that juries are seldom utilized in juvenile

339. See Mehta, supra note 2391 at note 121–26 (discussing fornication charges brought in
Idaho against pregnant teenagers and their boyfriends). Although such a practice is arguably legal, but see Mehta, supra note 239, at 130–151, it is certainly of questionable wisdom for, among
other reasons, the incentive it creates for pregnant minors to terminate their pregnancies rather
than risk evidence of their pregnancy providing the basis for a fornication charge. See Traci
Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 795 n. 211 (1998).
340. But see Mehta, supra note 239, at 130–34.
341. Phipps, supra note 275, at 435. While the punishment cases found that adolescents
are less deterrable than adults, there is no reason to believe that strict enforcement of fornication
would have no deterrent effect on any teenager even in light of the tendencies of adolescents to
seek instant gratification and be subject to peer influence. After reviewing the empirical data on
the subject, Christopher Slobogin summarized the situation as follows: “All [the] evidence supports the proposition that children are less deterrable than adults.” Slobogin, supra note 41, at
200.
342. Phipps, supra note 275. Justice Breyer expressed a similar idea in suggesting that mandatory drug tests of high school students who engage in extracurricular activities provides a basis
for students to resist peer pressure to take drugs. The drug testing program “offers the adolescent
a nonthreatening reason to decline his friend’s drug-use invitations, namely, that he intends to . . .
engage in [one of many] interesting and important [school] activities.” Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 840–41 (2002) (Breyer, J. concurring).
343. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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courts.345 Probably the biggest problem with aggressive enforcement
is the possibility of discouraging potential defendants from obtaining
contraception or seeking medical treatment for STDs or pregnancy.346
This risk may be exaggerated, however, because statutes in most states
permit adolescents privately to consent to treatment for STDs, to receive contraceptive drugs and devices, and, in some jurisdictions, to
consent to medical treatment for pregnancy—all without the
knowledge of their parents or anyone else. 347 If fornication statutes
were rigorously enforced, these statutory privacy protections would
likely become widely known to juveniles,348 thus minimizing the disincentive to seek medical care for fear of possible fornication charges.

345. A significant majority of jurisdictions forbid juries in juvenile court proceedings.
DAVIS, supra note 313 at 298–99. Even where juries are permitted, they are in fact seldom utilized.
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Reform, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 965, 1107 (1995).
346. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
347. Hartman, supra note 12, at 1309–10 (treatment for STDs); DAVIS, supra note 2, at 89
(access to contraceptive drugs and devices (federal rule requiring parental notice of such struck
down by the courts) and consent for pregnancy care). Over-the-counter forms of contraception
are legally available to teens of any age, and pharmacies do not need to contact parents. Poncz,
supra note 215, at 293. In many states, a youth does not need parental approval for prescription
contraception. Id. at 293–94. See also Scott, supra note 224, at 567–68 (minors in many states given
statutory rights to consent to treatment for STDs, birth control, and pregnancy).
With a statutory right to consent to treatment, medical providers are obligated to keep confidential their treatment of teenage patients except in cases of child abuse. Adolescents, Protecting: Ensuring Access to Care and Reporting Sexual Activity and Abuse (Position Paper), AMERICAN ACADEMY
FAMILY PHYSICIANS, http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/adolescent-protecting.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).

OF

348. As the risk of prosecution would likely become known by word of mouth communications among adolescents, so would word spread from those understanding the minimal risk of
evidence discovery from medical professionals to those assuming the existence a high risk of selfincrimination through obtaining medical care. Indeed, competence in making medical care decisions is the classic example of adolescent/adult cognitive equivalence. See, e.g., Scott, supra note
224, at 566–67 (“[D]evelopmental psychology evidence indicates that older minors are mature
enough in their cognitive development to make competent medical decisions.”). See also Schad,
supra note 207, at 398–99 (“informed consent” situations are “structured” and prevent “impulsive
action” by adolescents). Moreover, the state could itself inform the juvenile population that seeking medical care would have no bearing on potential fornication charges.
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At the same time, there is little reason to believe that rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes would significantly deter teenage sexual activity. Fornication is the ultimate “crime of passion,” making it
highly unlikely that many adolescents, already prone by nature to act
impulsively, would be deterred by the threat of prosecution,349 especially when it is understood that proceedings would be brought under
the rehabilitative umbrella of the juvenile court.350

349. Leading commentators question whether criminal statutes ever deter their proscribed
conduct. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darly, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L. J. 949, 951 (2003). Noting that
deterrent predictions are “enormously difficult,” these authors point out that three prerequisites
must exist is deterrence is to occur: (1) the potential offender must know the rule; (2) he must
perceive the cost of violation as greater than the perceived benefit; and (3) he must be able and
willing to bring such knowledge to bear on his conduct decision at the time of the offense. Id. at
952–53. Moreover, “personality types” inclined toward “impulsiveness and toward discounting
consequences” interfere with “rational calculation of self-interest by potential offenders,” thus
inhibiting deterrence. Id. at 955. Obviously, the characteristics of adolescence detailed by the
Supreme Court in the punishment cases, see supra note 269 and accompanying text, reflect “a
personality type” unlikely to be deterred, especially from a crime like fornication, where the passion of the moment is likely to override “rational calculation.”
350. The fact that fornication cases will be brought in juvenile court, see supra notes 31020 and accompanying text, might further minimize the deterrent effect of such prosecutions in
light of the fact that rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is generally the dispositional goal.
Even so, rehabilitative sanctions sometimes may be sufficiently unpleasant to create some deterrent effect. See Johannes Andenase, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 971 (1966). Furthermore, punitive sanctions—with their inherent impositions of unpleasantness upon offenders aimed in part at least to deter—are increasingly employed within
juvenile justice systems. See Gardner, supra note 103, at 6–22 (discussing the distinction between
coercive rehabilitation and punishment).
Even though minimal deterrence will likely be the result of sporadic enforcement of fornication
statutes, the situation is still defensible. In fact, one commentator argues:
The state’s most effective strategy for deterring consensual forms of disreputable conduct is likely to consist of criminalizing this conduct and enforcing the criminal ban
sporadically. Excluding the practically unfeasible option of super-strong sanctions, all
alternative strategies (which include (1) enforcing the law strictly or (2) not enacting
any law at all) are likely to deter fewer violators. If this is true, then, contrary to the
implication of standard political-economic accounts, states rationally would select a
lax enforcement strategy even if enforcement resources were abundant and public
opinion was almost uniform.
Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 440
(2002).
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Appreciable deterrence is not necessary to satisfy rational basis
scrutiny, however. There is no reason to believe that enforcement of
fornication statutes would have no deterrent effect at all.351 Any deterrence is enough. If policy makers decide that minimal deterrence is
worth the costs involved in rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes, that is a choice for them, and not the courts, to make.
But even if it could be shown that no deterrent effect is achieved
through enforcing fornication statutes, such enforcement should still
be deemed reasonable when it is remembered that juvenile courts have
jurisdiction over the matter. It is not unreasonable to believe that some
juvenile offenders might be helped after the fact of adjudication. For
example, sex education programs, backed by the power of the juvenile
court, could induce future abstinence in some offenders, or channel
others away from “unsafe” sexual practices. That such benefits might
occur only rarely does not negate the fact that they reasonably promote
the state interests bottoming fornication statutes.
Rather than rigorous enforcement, a more likely possibility in jurisdictions with fornication statutes is that they will rarely or never be
enforced. If so, their existence may counterproductively engender public disrespect for the law and encourage abuses of discretion by law
enforcement officials.352 These downsides are outweighed, however,
by several benefits that may flow from seldom enforced fornication
statutes.
The underlying purposes of fornication statutes may still be
achieved, albeit rarely, with sporadic enforcement. Some deterrence of
sexual activity may occur, especially in situations where the mere existence of the statute is appealed to as an objective basis for teens attempting abstinence to resist peer pressure to engage in sexual conduct.353 Furthermore, the possible benefits of juvenile court
dispositions would be available to the few adjudicated violators of the
statutes.

351. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
352. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 337, at 435–36. Unenforced laws, particularly
ones like fornication which proscribe conduct widely engaged in by the public, risk delegating
power to the police to decide for themselves who shall be subject to penal sanctions and why. Id.
at 335.
353. See supra note 342.
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That enforcement of fornication statutes occurs in juvenile court
mitigates the problem of potential abuses of law enforcement discretion often associated with seldom enforced statutes.354 As Kathy’s case
illustrates, parents may seek state assistance in discouraging sexual activity by their children through delinquency or status offense interventions.355 Where law enforcement is initiated by parents, the concerns
of police abuse of discretion and excessive governmental snooping in
gathering evidence are substantially minimized, if not eliminated altogether.
Furthermore, the presence of fornication statutes provides parents
state assistance in their attempts to instill in their children values of
sexual abstinence or “safe” sex.356 While resort to juvenile court intervention may not always yield clear benefits, and may sometimes damage parent/child relationships,357 allowing parents this alternative is a
reasonable state vehicle to grapple with the problem of rampant teenage sexual activity. Such an alternative addresses the concern that “the
sexual revolution . . . seem[s] to have made children equal partners . . .
with their parents . . . creat[ing] the false illusion that children have the
capacity for unrestricted adult experience.”358 Empowering parents
with the resources of juvenile court interventions for violations of fornication statutes reaffirms the parent as a “superior partner” vis-à-vis
her child, and renders moot the claim by some personhood advocates
that adolescents are “capable of choosing their own morality as long as
they do not commit [a violation of the law.]”359

354. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text.
356. One commentator observed that “lawmakers should recognize the indispensable role”
that parents play in “preventing their children from engaging in premature sexual experimentation.” Siji A. Moore, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to Regulate
Teen Sex through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L. J. 197, 231 (2008). In arguing that the
state should “empower” parents to better protect their children, the commentator claimed that
“[i]t is undisputable that a statute [sanctioning] teenagers . . . for sexual experimentation gives
parents who find out that their child is sexually active a powerful tool to terminate the activity
and deter it from happening in the future.” Id.
357. See supra note 273.
358. Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1991).
359. Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character, 110
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Even as never enforced dead letter law, fornication statutes may
still serve appropriate purposes. One commentator has even argued
that “[n]on-enforcement of fornication statutes may be desirable” in
view of the possible negative impact of enforcement on obtaining
health care discussed above.360 Non-enforced statutes can serve the educative function of signaling inappropriate behavior through announcing prevailing, or inducing new, social norms.361 Moreover, if existing
fornication statutes are repealed, the message—technically that sexual
activity between minors is “permitted” and not “protected”362—might
be interpreted by young people to be that the state and society approve
of the conduct previously proscribed by the statute.363 Finally, total
non-enforcement of fornication statutes would not be without some
deterrent effect. As mentioned above, the mere existence of fornication
statutes could provide a basis for some teens to resist peer pressure to
engage in sexual activity.364
The above discussion establishes that legitimate state interests are
reasonably furthered through proscribing teenage sexual activity
through the instrumentality of fornication statutes, whether rigorously, seldom, or never enforced.365 Whatever the wisdom of enacting
such statutes, they are clearly constitutional.

DAEDALUS 135, 146 (1981) (noting the “crisis of authority in the American school”). Bruce
Hafen has noted that “[d]enying a portion of parental authority necessarily adds to the authority
of children.” Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5, at 654. The opposite is also true: Denying
a portion of authority to children necessarily adds to parental authority.
360. Stratton, supra note 339, at 795.
361. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2032, 2035
(1996) (arguing that “coercion might be defended as a way of increasing social sanctions” on such
risk-taking activity as unsafe sex, with the possible result of producing a “new norm[ ] or new
understanding of existing information.”).
362. Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4 at 567.
363. Stratton, supra note 339, at 796.
364. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
365. At least one post-Lawrence court has recognized the legitimacy of protecting minors
from the dangers of STDs through statutes prohibiting sexual contact. See In re R.L.C., 643
S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007) (upholding sodomy statute when applied to minors). See also In re L.A.N.,
623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that fornication statutes applied to minors are constitutional). Allender, supra note 248, at 1854.
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D. Summary

While fornication statutes are almost certainly unconstitutional
when applied to adults under the Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision,
the Court’s juvenile punishment cases require differentiating between
adults and adolescents when assessing rights to engage in private, consensual sexual intimacies. The adult personhood rights recognized in
Lawrence do not apply to the categorically distinct class of adolescents.
The very characteristics that protect adolescents from harsh adult punishments also justify state protection of young people from the hazards
associated with non-marital sexual activity.

VI. Conclusion
With very few exceptions, the Supreme Court has consistently
voiced a protectionist posture when considering constitutional issues
involving young people. The Court has traditionally reached its decisions relying on common sense conclusions regarding the differences
between children—including adolescents—and adults, without attending to relevant social science data that would arguably have informed
the issues at hand. In particular, the Court has disregarded research
suggesting that adolescents and adults possess comparable capacities to
reason logically when making decisions about moral, social, and interpersonal matters. Prior to the Court’s punishment cases, critics had
argued that acknowledgment of this research should cause the Court
to shift from its protectionist posture to a broader, if not total, recognition of personhood rights for adolescents.
However, rather than a broader embrace of adolescent personhood, the Court has recently decidedly reinforced its protectionist
view by directly appealing, for the first time, to psychological research
that shows not the similarities but rather the differences between the
mental functioning of adolescents and adults. Relying on the data, the
Court found that adolescents are categorically less culpable than adults
and must thus be protected under the Eighth Amendment from the
harshest penalties imposed on adult criminal offenders. The Court
specifically found that when compared to adults, young people under
age eighteen manifest unique propensities to engage in reckless behavior and to be influenced by negative peer pressure. Also different from
adults, adolescents exhibit underdeveloped and transitory character
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development. Such conclusions imply—assuming a continued disregard of the social science supporting recognition of personhood
rights—that perhaps the Court has finally laid the empirical foundations for a systematic protectionist theory of rights throughout the
whole of juvenile law.
I have argued that, whether or not the punishment cases portend
ubiquitous protectionism, the cases do provide important precedential
value in contexts outside Eighth Amendment excessive punishment issues. Specifically, I have shown that the Court’s adolescent/adult distinction resolves the otherwise controversial issue of the constitutionality of governmental prohibitions of fornication between teenagers.
In demonstrating the constitutionality of such prohibitions, I highlighted ways in which fornication statutes promote legitimate governmental and parental interests, thereby refuting claims that adolescents
possess constitutionally protected personhood rights to engage in private, consensual sexual relations.
Such a conclusion may not be of great practical moment, but it is,
at least, a symbolically significant advancement in the on-going task of
defining the scope of constitutional rights of young people. As shown
by this paper’s discussion of teenage sexual activity, the future direction of that task may be dramatically shaped by the Supreme Court’s
empirically grounded recognition of the uniqueness of adolescence
spelled out in the juvenile punishment cases.
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